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1.  Framework 
 
My cumulative dissertation “strategic benchmarking for hospitals” comprises three research 
papers published between 2008 and 2010. I started the underlying research as an external 
doctoral student at the Department of Innovation and Technology Management of the 
University of Vienna after receiving my master’s degree in business administration in 2002. 
Since 2003, I have additionally been working as a researcher in the field of health economics 
and health policy at the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna. 
My contribution to the research field consists of three thematically related research papers 
as required by the University’s guidelines for cumulative dissertations. The submitted papers 
can be subsumed within the overarching research topic “strategic benchmarking for 
hospitals”. A special emphasis is put on the development of the business logic of an internet-
based management game, which illustrates the economic and organizational decision-
making processes in a hospital by using discrete event simulation. The deployment of this 
game in teaching, policy, and research can improve policy making at the hospital, regional, 
and national levels. 
2. Selected Papers 
 
The submission encompasses three papers which were published in international peer-
reviewed journals:  
A1. Kraus M., Rauner M.S., Schwarz S. (2010): Hospital management games: a taxonomy 
and extensive review. Central European Journal of Operations Research 18:567-591. 
A2. Rauner M.S., Kraus M., Schwarz S. (2008): Competition under different 
reimbursement systems: The concept of an internet-based hospital management 
game. European Journal of Operational Research 185:948-963. 
A3. O'Neill L., Rauner M.S., Heidenberger K., Kraus M. (2008): A cross-national 
comparison and taxonomy of DEA-based hospital efficiency studies. Socio-Economic 
Planning Sciences 42:158-189. 
3. Discussion of Research Results 
 
My interest in the field of health care, and particularly in hospital benchmarking, was 
prompted by the main challenge faced by the health care systems of many Western 
countries, namely increasing costs accompanied simultaneously by decreasing revenues. 
One of the major cost drivers in these countries are advances in technology as well as 
increases in life expectancy occurring together with a rising number of multi-morbid elderly 
people. Consequently, the health care sector consumes a major share of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of these countries. In 2008, on average, the EU-15 countries spent 9.8 percent 
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of their GDP, that is US-$ 3,336 per capita, on health care, and in the US, 16.0 percent of the 
GDP or US-$ 7,538 per capita went into this sector (OECD 2010).  
In Europe, the US, and other Western economies, the executives’ interest in containing 
health care costs and increasing the sector’s efficiency has been high on the political agenda. 
Careful planning and coordination of resources, processes, and finances is imperative for 
increasing the efficiency of hospitals, which consume a large share of total health care 
expenditures. In Europe, more than 36 percent of these costs are attributed to the hospital 
sector, whereas in the US, hospital costs amount to 25 percent of total health care 
expenditures (OECD 2010). To reduce this financial burden, national, regional, and local 
governments search for suitable approaches. A first step towards the evaluation of a health 
care system and, as a consequence, the efficient distribution of human and economic 
resources in this sector, is efficiency measurement.  
In general, for efficiency measurement in health care, data envelopment analysis (DEA) has 
proven to be a suitable instrument. This non-parametric approach measures the relative 
efficiency of decision making units (DMUs) measured by the ratio of the weighted sum of 
outputs and the weighted sum of inputs. The weights for both inputs and outputs are 
determined endogenously in the model, such that the efficiency measure of each DMU is 
maximized subject to the constraint that the efficiency score lies within the bounds of 0 and 
1. The scores thus calculated produce the efficiency frontier, on which the Pareto optimal 
DMUs are located (Charnes et al. 1978 and 1994). 
Reviewing the application of efficiency measurements in the hospital sector was therefore 
the key motivation for the first paper (A3). Its main research task was 1) to provide a cross-
national comparison and taxonomy of hospital efficiency studies which used DEA and related 
techniques for efficiency measurement and 2) to demonstrate the broad applicability of DEA 
in the hospital sector. In this context, 79 hospital efficiency studies from 1984 to 2004, 
covering 12 countries were reviewed. The studies were classified into three groups based on 
their country of origin: Europe, the US, and other countries. The use of statistical tests aimed 
at identifying significant differences between Europe and the US for various study 
characteristics: number of DMUs, input categories, output categories, allocative efficiency 
(Yes/No), multi time periods (Yes/No), average efficiency score, and percentage of efficient 
DMUs.  
The results disclose significant differences between Europe and the US in terms of important 
study characteristics. The average number of DMUs was significantly larger in US studies 
than in European ones. Furthermore, US studies tended to use more input categories, but 
fewer output categories. Also, 52 percent of the European studies incorporated allocative 
efficiency, compared with 12 percent of the US studies. Furthermore, 60 percent of the 
European studies were based on panel data, compared with 25 percent of the US studies. 
Finally, the analysis highlights that both the average efficiency score and the percentage of 
efficient DMUs were slightly higher for studies of European hospitals.  
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Since the main objective of my dissertation was to develop the business logic of a hospital 
management game, a particular focus in A3 was put on identifying the most important input 
and output variables to support the design process of the game. On the one hand, the 
analysis of the input variables, therefore, served as a basis for identifying key categories in 
the decision making processes in the hospital game. On the other hand, the analysis of the 
output variables aimed at identifying key categories for the development of the game’s 
performance measurement system.  
Through the analysis of the input variables, three broad categories were derived: capital 
investment, labor, and other operating expenses. Capital investment is a central input 
category when measuring the efficiency of hospitals. Accurate data on capital investment, 
however, is difficult to obtain. Consequently, in many hospital efficiency studies, “number of 
beds” is used as a standard proxy for capital investment. This proxy variable was then further 
disaggregated into acute care and long-term care beds. Another proxy used for capital 
investment is “number of hospital services”. The second and most crucial input category for 
efficiency measurement of hospitals is represented by the variable labor, since about two 
thirds of hospital operating costs are payroll expenses. Its frequently used proxies are 
“number of personnel” or “labor expenses”. The “number of personnel” variable was either 
defined as one general labor input variable or subdivided into “number of physicians”, 
“number of nurses”, “number of medical/clinical staff”, “number of technical staff”, and 
“number of management and administrative staff”. While the physician category was further 
disaggregated, for example, into “number of general medical doctors” and “number of 
specialized medical doctors”, the nursing category also distinguished between “number of 
registered nurses”, “number of licensed practical nurses”, and “number of nursing support 
staff.” Labor expenses were variously subdivided into “general staff costs”, “nursing staff 
costs”, “medical staff costs”, and “other staff costs”. Operating expenses is the third main 
input category in the reviewed hospital efficiency studies. Its most common proxy variable 
was “operating expenses excluding payroll, capital, and deprecation”. “Supply costs” were 
another frequently used proxy for operating expenses. These costs were variously 
disaggregated into “equipment costs”, “medical supply costs”, “food costs”, “drug and 
pharmaceutical costs”, and “material costs”. 
The analysis of the output variables of the reviewed hospital efficiency studies, identified 
three broad categories: “medical visits, cases, patients, and surgeries”, “inpatient days”, and 
“admission, discharges, and services”. The most important output variables for measuring 
the outpatient activities of hospitals were “number of outpatient visits”, “number of 
outpatients”, and “number of outpatient surgeries”. Most commonly, the outpatient visits 
were subdivided into “emergency visits” and “non-emergency visits”. The output variables 
for measuring inpatient activities of hospitals highly depend on the hospital reimbursement 
system. Therefore, hospital efficiency studies opt for “cases” or “adjusted discharges” when 
hospitals are reimbursed on a case-/DRG-based system, while they tend to use “inpatient 
days” for hospitals with day-based reimbursement. The inpatient day category was often 
disaggregated by method of payment, care intensity (e.g., acute, long-term patient days), 
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and hospital division (e.g., surgical, psychiatric, pediatric inpatient days) to capture the case-
mix of a hospital.  
As the major goal of my dissertation was to develop the business logic of a hospital 
management game, in A1 special emphasis was placed on assessing the state of the art of 
existing hospital games, their main characteristics as well as their shortages with respect to, 
for example, the adaptation to new reimbursement systems. A1 thus derives a taxonomy of 
hospital management games. This taxonomy provides a unique classification of the precise 
decision making of players in resource, process, and financial management by describing the 
applied operations research (OR) techniques. In this context, 13 hospital management 
games were classified according to general classification attributes, application area, target 
player groups, decision making, and OR techniques used (cf. Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Structure of the taxonomy for health care management games 
 
Source: own compilation.  
The analysis of the general classification attributes indicates that the majority of the games 
exhibit at least one of the following characteristics: they can be classified as general games, 
in that they focus on the entire or main functions of a hospital, are characterized by a rather 
complex game situation, are played online, and are played in a setting of indirect 
competition, where the players’ performances are evaluated only in terms of predefined 
criteria. With regard to the gaming process, the majority of the games allow a game host to 
vary both internal conditions (e.g., number of beds, number of operating rooms) and 
Decision Making
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external conditions (e.g., reimbursement system), use quarterly rounds, and evaluate the 
results after each round.  
Furthermore, the taxonomy shows that teaching is the main application area of hospital 
management games. However, they are also used for policy purposes for the illustration of 
how regulations impact decision making as well as outcomes and for research purpose to 
investigate different game situations by controlled experiments. Hospital management 
games target different player groups, such as health care leaders/policy makers, health care 
practitioners/professionals, hospitals staff, and students. The majority of games reviewed 
are designed to be played by hospital staff (e.g., doctors, nurses, medical staff, technical 
staff, administrative and management staff) as well as economic, management, and medical 
students. 
Also, the analysis of decision making yields some interesting findings. Hospital management 
games have a different game foci regarding decision making resulting from their differing 
emphasis on resource, process, and/or financial management. Consequently, three game 
categories for decision making were identified: 1) resource and financial management 
focused games, 2) resource and process management focused games, and 3) resource, 
process, and financial management focused games. Games of the first category treat 
structure quality as a main factor determining the outcome. The hospital processes are 
modeled as black-boxes using equation-based techniques. All games in this group neglect 
queuing of patient services and do not account for patient and staff scheduling. The majority 
of the games reviewed fall into this category. Games of the second category use process 
quality as an additional contributor to outcome quality. Since process management contains 
more operational decisions, it requires discrete event simulation for queuing of patients. 
Such games model the decisions in resource management by allowing for the planning of the 
availability of personnel and non-human resources, but restrict decisions pertaining to 
financial management to a minimum. Games of the third category focus on structure and 
process quality and account for reimbursement, therefore, discrete event simulation for 
modeling patient flows is needed. 
The findings also illustrate that the decision making process of participants forms the core of 
hospital management games. Participants make decisions with respect to resource, process, 
and/or financial management in all games reviewed. Resource management decisions in the 
games intend to simulate the importance of forecasting, developing, and controlling 
resources. It is the crucial role of resource management to combine capacity planning for 
human and non-human resources, service planning, and staff and non-staff resource 
allocation. A shortage of capacities, a lack of service planning, and a misallocation of 
resources slow down processes, prolong waiting periods for patients, increase staff 
workload, lower quality of treatment/care, and may therefore also increase costs. A certain 
amount of resources has to be available for emergency patients and/or unexpected events. 
The aim of process management decisions is the training for patient and staff scheduling. 
Patient scheduling issues comprise admission planning, care planning, queuing planning for 
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services, and discharge planning. Scheduling strategies affect the number of patients 
admitted and discharged as well as the number of laboratory examinations, radiology 
examinations, and surgeries performed in a given period. Financial management decisions 
encompass efficient and effective planning with scarce financial resources, which is 
especially important in times of increasing expenditures and decreasing revenues. Successful 
financial management is highly dependent on appropriate resource management. For 
hospital management games, financial management decisions consist of decisions on cash 
outflows (e.g., equipment, buildings/rooms, financial investments) on the one hand and 
decisions on cash inflows (e.g., reimbursement, services charges, donations, revenues from 
financial investments) on the other. 
The investigation of the OR techniques highlights that they are used to model both the 
internal and external environment of hospitals and to facilitate the decision making of the 
players. In the games reviewed, the following OR techniques were applied: agency/game 
theory, decision making theory, system dynamics, discrete-event simulation, assignment 
problem, priority rules, staff scheduling, stock-keeping, forecasting, data envelopment 
analysis, and technology assessment.  
The conclusions of the analysis reveal that hospital management games and OR have gained 
importance in better planning the use of scarce resources in times of tight budgets, growing 
health care demand, and increasing technology costs. They enable health care policy 
makers, health care professionals, hospital staff, and students to study the real-world 
environment in an artificial game setting. Regarding the game focus, different hospital 
management games place different emphases on resource, process, and/or financial 
management. 
Based on A1 as well as A3, paper A2 then deals directly with the main aspiration of my 
dissertation by developing the concept of the business logic of an internet-based hospital 
management game, which was given the name of COREmain hospital. It illustrates the 
economic and organizational decision making processes in a hospital by using discrete event 
simulation. COREmain hospital simulates a region with up to six hospitals treating patients in 
different disease categories. Within this region, hospitals compete against each other for 
inpatients depending on the general and variable conditions of the game. The game host 
sets up the general conditions by defining the health policy of the region, the inpatient 
reimbursement system, the labor market situation for medical staff, and the radiology 
technologies available at the beginning of the game. The hospital player groups then 
determine the variable conditions by defining the mission of their hospital at the outset of 
the game and again after six periods. Each hospital has up to 500 beds and consists of four 
departments: management, nursing, radiology, and surgery. When playing the game, each 
player is responsible for one department in one hospital.  
The defining feature of COREmain hospital is to teach players about the interdependencies 
of resource, process, and financial management in the management, nursing, radiology, and 
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surgery departments. The players manage resources such as personnel in the nursing, 
radiology, and surgery departments, machines in the radiology department, and operating 
rooms in the surgery department. They also plan processes like admissions in the 
management department and patient scheduling in radiology and surgery and control 
finances by determining the discharge policy of patients. All decisions of the players mutually 
influence each other and are affected by the general and variable conditions (cf. Figure 2). 
For example, the more resources that are available, the more patients can be admitted and 
the shorter the waiting times in radiology and surgery. Also, the better processes are 
coordinated, the earlier patients can be discharged.  
Figure 2: Resource, process, and financial management of the game 
 
Source: Rauner et al. 2008 (A2). 
The uniqueness of COREmain hospital lies, in addition to the internet-based framework and 
the combination of resource, process, and financial management, in the fact that different 
inpatient reimbursement systems are considered. It allows for simulating four different 
reimbursement systems: 1) inpatient days independent of diagnosis and treatment, 2) 
Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs) with unlimited budget, 3) DRGs with limited budget, and 4) 
global budgets. This feature of the game enables players to learn about the impact of the 
length of stay on the revenue of a hospital, subject to the type of reimbursement system. A 
reimbursement system based on inpatient days is dependent on the inpatients’ length of 
stay. In such a system an extended stay is highly compensated. For this reason, there is a 
tendency in this case to discharge patients with expensive treatments later as compared to 
patients with cheaper treatments since higher patient costs can only be covered through a 
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more lengthy stay. In contrast, a reimbursement system based on DRGs is generally 
independent of the inpatients’ length of stay because a longer stay is only partly 
compensated. A reimbursement system based on a global budget completely neglects the 
inpatient length of stay.  
The game is able to simulate up to 15 operative (e.g., appendectomy, hysterectomy, hip 
replacement) and non-operative (e.g., myocardial infarction, stroke) patient categories 
covering a wide range of medical disciplines in a hospital. All treatment paths are based on 
real-life-data containing information on the required radiology examinations and durations 
as well as on operative cases with the kind of surgery and duration needed. In addition, the 
patient paths include the minimum medically-induced waiting time for radiology 
examinations and surgeries, the minimal and medically-recommended length of stay as well 
as the nursing category, which vary with different states of the path.  
Furthermore, the game calculates the main costs of the nursing, radiology, and surgery 
departments. The nursing costs include staff costs as well as variable material costs per day. 
The radiology costs take account of staff costs, fixed and variable material costs as well as 
deduction costs for radiology machines. The surgery costs cover staff costs, fixed and 
variable material costs as well as deduction costs for operating rooms.  
The collection of real-life-data for the treatment paths and cost categories was a key 
prerequesite for developing COREmain hospital. The data collection was chiefly supported 
by Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Hauptverband der österreichischen 
Sozialversicherungsträger, and Krankenhaus der Barmherzigen Schwestern Vienna. The 
Hauptverband der österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger supplied the total number of 
cases per patient category treated in all Austrian hospitals. These data enabled the 
identification of the 15 most important operative and non-operative patient categories. The 
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit made reimbursement data for these selected patient 
categories available. The Krankenhaus der Barmherzigen Schwestern Vienna provided 
individual patient data to derive patient pathways of the selected patient categories. 
Furthermore, they supplied cost and financial statement data. 
The performance of each hospital is evaluated at the end of each period based on the 
following pre-selected performance measures: quality of medical care, staff satisfaction, 
patient satisfaction, occupancy rate, length of stay, number of patients discharged, regional 
market share, severity index, dismissal rate, surplus, costs and – in case of a DRG-based 
reimbursement system – number of DRG-points, not-discovered DRG-creep, and value per 
DRG-point . The winner of the game is the hospital player group which performed best both 
in fulfilling their own hospital mission targets and the regional health policy targets over the 
12 month periods.  
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4. Conclusions  
 
In recent years, the high and growing costs of health care systems owing to technological 
innovations, ageing patients, and an increasing number of demanding health care consumers 
have become a vital and pressing issue in Western countries. In the EU-15 countries, 
between 2000 and 2008, total expenditures on health care (expressed as a share of GDP) 
rose from 8.7 percent to 9.8 percent, which translates into an increase of 1.1 percentage 
points within eight years. Amounting to costs of 13.4 percent of GDP in 2000 and 16 percent 
in 2008, the US health care system is confronted with even higher expenses and yet more 
drastic growth (OECD 2010). Consequently, strategies both for containing health care costs 
and increasing this sector’s efficiency are the focal points in political discussions in most 
Western economies.  
To increase the efficiency of hospitals, which in Europe are responsible for more than one 
third of health care expenditures, careful planning and coordination of resource, process, 
and financial management is imperative. A precondition for effective and efficient hospital 
management is a detailed understanding of the interdependencies in the hospital decision 
making processes. This fact brought about the development of hospital management games 
with the goal of training hospital staff and health care decision makers. The first such game 
emerged in the late 1970s. Since then, hospital management games have been a proven 
training tool for decision making in hospitals. They play a key role for educating students, 
hospital staff, and health care policy makers to best plan the use of scarce resources under 
consideration of both the internal and external environment.  
In general, hospital management games help players better understand the reality by means 
of a simplified simulation. The players can study the effects of repeating decisions as well as 
of choosing alternative ones. Unlike in the real world setting, wrong decisions by players 
bear no real consequences. Ideally, players connect the skills and knowledge developed in a 
hospital management game and transfer them to real-life situations. For example, a hospital 
manger can use the newly gained insights to improve the resource, process, and financial 
management in his/her hospital which could lead to an increase in the hospital’s efficiency. 
Whether or not such changes would then have led to greater efficiency can then once again 
be determined with the use of DEA-method. 
COREmain hospital, for which, within the framework of my dissertation, I was responsible for 
the development of the business logic, is a promising tool for training more efficient decision 
making in hospitals. Its uniqueness consists of the internet-based framework, the 
combination of resource, process, and financial management in a set-up with 
interchangeable reimbursement systems and environmental conditions. COREmain hospital 
illustrates the economic and organizational decision making processes in a hospital and is 
designed to be played by students, hospital staff, and health care decision makers. It seeks 
not only to help students and hospital staff understand decision making in complex 
situations, but also to illustrate to policy makers how potential changes in regulation impact 
hospital decision making and outcomes.  
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My scientific contribution to the field of health care lies in the preparation of the concept of 
COREmain hospital, a new and unique hospital management game. 
5. Literature 
 
Charnes A., Cooper W.W., Rhodes E. (1978): Measuring the efficiency of decision making 
units. European Journal of Operational Research 2:429-444. 
Charnes A., Cooper W.W., Lewin A.Y., Seiford L.M. (1994): Data Envelopment Analysis: 
Theory, Methodology, and Applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
OECD (2010): OECD Health Data 2010.  
  
Section 2: Papers 
  
  
A1 
 
CEJOR (2010) 18:567–591
DOI 10.1007/s10100-010-0178-z
ORIGINAL PAPER
Hospital management games: a taxonomy and extensive
review
Markus Kraus · Marion S. Rauner ·
Sigrun Schwarz
Published online: 22 October 2010
© Springer-Verlag 2010
Abstract Hospital management games have gained importance in better planning
for scarce resources in times of growing health care demand and increasing technol-
ogy costs. We classify and investigate the main characteristics of these games from
an Operations Research (OR) perspective. Hospital management games model the
complex decision making process of internal resource, process, and financial manage-
ment all influenced by the external hospital environment (e.g., purchasing markets,
job markets, legal/political conditions, competition) and simulate situations of the real
world. We also highlight the potential of these games for teaching OR in the classroom.
Experiencing the advantages of OR may reduce the reservations policy makers have
and could make them increasingly open to promoting OR applications in practice.
We also disclose potential for new applications.
Keywords Hospital management games · Decision making ·
Operations research techniques
M. Kraus
Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies,
Stumpergasse 56, 1060 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: markus-kraus@aon.at
M. S. Rauner (B)
Department of Innovation and Technology Management, University of Vienna, School of Business,
Economics and Statistics, Bruenner Str. 72, 1210 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: marion.rauner@univie.ac.at
URL: http://www.univie.ac.at/bwl/itm/staff/rauner.htm
S. Schwarz
Department of Nursing, University of Applied Sciences Muenster,
Leonardo Campus 8, 48149 Muenster, Germany
e-mail: sschwarz@fh-muenster.de
123
568 M. Kraus et al.
1 Introduction
“A game is a set of activities involving one or more players. It has goals, constraints,
payoffs, and consequences. A game is rule-guided and artificial in some respects.
Finally, a game involves some aspects of competition, even if that competition is with
oneself (Dempsey et al. 2002).”
Gaming has a long history. War games were already played in China and India
around 3000 BC and 1000 BC, respectively. For example, in the 17th and 18th cen-
turies war chess games (e.g., KING’S GAME, NEW KRIEGSSPIEL, WAR CHESS)
became more serious and complex (Lane 1995). In the latter part of the 19th cen-
tury, the so-called rigid war games employed charts, tables, and calculations to,
for instance, simulate troop movements. Random effects were included by using
dice. During World War II, war business games gained popularity (e.g., BARBA-
ROSSA, SEA LION, TOTAL WAR IN PASIFIC) (Rohn 1995). At the same time,
Operations Research (OR) emerged in the United Kingdom to optimize war-related
strategic and logistic problems in air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and bombing
(Rau 2005).
Recognizing the potential for management, numerous games for general manage-
ment, accounting, finance, marketing, as well as production and logistics have been
developed since the 1950’s (Faria and Wellington 2004; Kibbee et al. 1961; Watson and
Blackstone 1981). Early popular games include: (1) TOP MANAGEMENT DECI-
SION SIMULATION, (2) TOP MANAGEMENT DECISION GAME, (3) BUSI-
NESS MANAGEMENT GAME, and (4) THE CARNEGIE TECH MANAGEMENT
GAME.
Playing management games offers many advantages (Bochennek et al. 2007; Brandl
et al. 2010; Dieleman and Huisingh 2006; Faria and Dickinson 1994) such as that, for
example, different management theories and fields can be illustrated. In the artificial
setting of a game, players can study the process and effects of choosing among decision
making alternatives. Decisions can be repeated and feedback is given immediately.
Wrong decisions are not always really crucial. Playing games helps develop a shared
view of a problem, facilitates mutual understanding, and also enhances team-building
and team-work within a group of participants with different cultural, academic, and
social backgrounds. Internet-mediated games were instrumental in enriching interac-
tion and communication across time and over distance and provided an open gateway
for entering into a game (Dasgupta 2003).
However, some disadvantages of management games have to be taken into account
as well (Lane 1995). Goals and learning effects are often not sufficiently clear to the
participants. The determination of the optimal level of complexity and the compression
of time are difficult but necessary to simulate a simplified model of reality. Briefing
and debriefing are sometimes neglected. Thus, a systematic design process, a validity
check by experts and further players, and extensive testing are crucial (Peters et al.
1998).
As health care expenditures consume at least 10% of the gross national product
in many industrialized countries, health care games emerged in this area in the late
1960’s (Panosch 2008). They are applied in two areas: medical education and health
care management.
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Medical education games for training and teaching students and/or staff how to best
treat a patient emerged during the 1970’s (Blakely et al. 2009; Bochennek et al. 2007;
Panosch 2008). Such games have high potential for decreasing medical errors, facili-
tating open exchange in training situations, and improving patient safety. Some of the
most well-known games include: (1) GERIATRIX—a role-playing game to illustrate
the complexity of geriatric patient care (Hoffman et al. 1985); (2) the LACTATION
GAME—a quiz game to provide knowledge about breast feeding (Elder and Gregory
1996); (3) the PAIN GAME—a board game to teach pain assessment and manage-
ment to nurses (Morton and Tarvin 2001); and (4) the PEDIATRIC BOARD GAME—a
board game to transmit paediatric knowledge (Ogershok and Cottrell 2004).
Since the 1980’s, human patient simulators have been used as a key teaching tool
for medical education (Bradley 2006). Competency in the application of knowledge
and technical skills of medical staff can be measured without harming a real patient
(Nehring et al. 2001). For example, the ANESTHESIA CRISES RESOURCE MAN-
AGEMENT TOOL uses a patient simulator to train anaesthesiologists interacting in
teams and managing crises (Gaba et al. 2001).
The first health care management games appeared during the 1970’s. These games
gained importance due to rising health care costs resulting from expensive technolo-
gies, ageing patients, and an increasing number of demanding patients.
Two games that investigate setting up and running medical practices are notewor-
thy. Reisman et al. (1977) developed a game for dentists to plan their practice, while
Mulcahy et al. (1981) provide a game which enables prospective and practicing phy-
sicians to learn decision making for medical practice administration.
Particularly, hospital games play a key role for educating students, health care
staff, health care professionals, and health care policy makers to best plan in the face
of scarce resources. This is why we decided to investigate such games in more detail.
Players learn to consider both the internal and external environment of a hospital for
decision making. The main issues are put forward in Fig. 1.
Purchasing markets, job markets, legal/political conditions, and competition among
hospitals form the external environment of a hospital. Within the context of this exter-
nal framework as well as the internal conditions, players make decisions concerning
resource, process, and financial management. Efficient and effective resource and
process management in the situation of a particular inpatient reimbursement system
impact on the number/category of inpatients as well as their length of stay, quality of
treatment, and care provided. This also affects liquidity which consists of cash inflows
(e.g., reimbursement, service charges, donations, revenues from financial investments,
raising of external financial capital) and cash outflows (e.g., assets, expenditures). In
health care, decision makers have to balance economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and
equity. In the next section, we discuss and classify in detail the main hospital manage-
ment games based on this framework for teaching and policy decision making.
2 Taxonomy for hospital management games
For our literature review on hospital management games, we searched the follow-
ing databases: Blackwell Synergy, EconLit, Jstor, ProQuest, PubMed, ScienceDirect,
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Resource Management
• Capacity Planning 
•Staff (e.g., Operating Room Teams, Doctors, Nurses, Radiology Assistants)
•Beds
•Buildings/Departments/Rooms
•Therapeutic and Diagnostic Procedures/Service Capacities
•Other Equipment & Material
•Additional Agencies/Centres/Clinics/Facilities
• Service Planning (e.g., Nursing, Laboratory, Pharmacy, Radiology, Surgery) 
• Staff Resource Allocation
• Non-Staff Resource Allocation (e.g., Bed Allocation to Departments)
Process Management
• Patient Scheduling
• Admission Planning
• Care Planning
• Queue Planning for Services (e.g., Laboratory, Radiology, Surgery) 
• Discharge Planning
• Staff Scheduling 
• Staff Rostering
Financial  Management
• Cash Outflows (e.g., Assets, Expenditures)
• Cash Inflows (e.g., Reimbursement, Service Charges, Donations, Revenues from Financial Investments, Raising of External Financial Capital)
Economy
Efficiency Effectiveness
Equity Competition
•Policy of Other Hospitals
Legal/Political Conditions
•Regional Health Policy
•Reimbursement System
•Hospital Law
•Labour Law
PurchasingMarkets
• Equipment Market
• Material Market
• PharmaceuticalMarket
Job Markets
Fig. 1 Decision making in a hospital depending on the external environment
and SSCI. Initial key words include “games,” “games AND health care,” and “games
AND hospitals.” We identified 13 hospital management games (Cromwell et al. 1998;
Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Hans and Nieberg 2007; Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al.
1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz
1992; Warnke 2001) as well as their follow-up games: (1) KLIMA (Meyer 1982)
that was replaced by KLIMA FORTE (Schwandt 1998) and (2) ASTERIKS (Schwarz
1992) that was replaced by PRIMA KLINIK (Warnke 2001) (cf. Table 1). We excluded
games described only in technical reports and proceedings due to limited data avail-
ability or games developed by commercial organizations.
An early classification of management games includes the distinction of general
versus functional games, stochastic versus deterministic games, multi-period versus
single-period games, fixed-goal versus individual-goal systems, competing versus
non-competing game situation, as well as online and offline games (Koller 1974).
Some hospital management games (e.g., Flessa 2001; Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998;
Schwarz 1992) use this classification to describe their own game. Schweinhammer
(2008) investigates departments and functions, reimbursement systems, and rough
decision categories involved in the decision making in certain hospital management
games (Hofweber 1987; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz
1992; Warnke 2001). Panosch (2008) expands on previous classifications of hospital
management games by adding a few more games (e.g., Cromwell et al. 1998; Flessa
2001; Hans and Nieberg 2007; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989), further rough decision cate-
gories, and a discussion on the game reports provided to the players.
We extend these classifications found in the literature by providing a unique
classification of the precise decisions making of players in resource, process, and
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Table 1 Summary of the 13 hospital management games reviewed
Reference Name of the game Authors Year Country
Cromwell et al. (1998) DRAGON Cromwell et al. 1998 Australia
Feldstein (1986) STRATEGIC
PLANNING
GAME
Feldstein 1986 USA
Flessa (2001) MOSHI Flessa 2001 Germany/Tansania
Hans and Nieberg (2007) OPERATING
ROOM
MANAGER
GAME
Hans and Nieberg 2007 Netherlands
Hofweber (1987) ARKTIS Hofweber 1987 Germany
Knotts et al. (1982) HOSPSIM Knotts et al. 1982 USA
Knotts et al. (1989) CHESS Knotts et al. 1989 USA
Meredith (1978) THE HOSPITAL GAME Meredith 1978 USA
Meyer (1982) KLIMA Meyer 1982 Germany
Rauner et al. (2008) COREMAIN HOSPITAL Rauner et al. 2008 Austria
Schwandt (1998) KLIMA FORTE Schwandt 1998 Germany
Schwarz (1992) ASTERIKS Schwarz 1992 Germany
Warnke (2001) PRIMA KLINIK Warnke 2001 Germany
financial management by describing the OR techniques used. We classify hospi-
tal games according to the following criteria: (1) general classification attributes
(sub-section 2.1), (2) application area (sub-section 2.2), (3) target player groups
(sub-section 2.3), (4) decision making (sub-section 2.4), and (5) OR techniques used
(sub-section 2.5).
2.1 General classification attributes
First, we discuss general attributes of hospital management games: (1) generality, (2)
complexity, (3) communication medium, (4) competition, and (5) gaming process.
Regarding generality, hospital management games can be either general or func-
tional. General games focus on playing the entire or main functions of a hospital
(Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith
1978; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992), whereas
functional games are applied to special hospital departments or functions (Hans and
Nieberg 2007; Hofweber 1987). PRIMA KLINIK (Warnke 2001) can be both played
as a general or a functional game; in the latter players are only responsible for running
either the department of nursing, radiology, or surgery. As examples for functional
games, OPERATING ROOM MANAGER GAME (Hans and Nieberg 2007) illus-
trates operating room management, while ARKTIS (Hofweber 1987) models drug
supply in a pharmacy department of a hospital.
In a non-complex game situation, only a very limited number of decisions are avail-
able and effects of decisions made can be determined well. Typical for management
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games is that the interdependencies of various actions cannot be easily foreseen.
Various random events and stochastic effects may influence the results as well. Thus,
players experience random game situations and learn which of their decisions are most
critical for pursuing health policy objectives. All games reviewed are characterized by
such a, rather complex, game situation. One of the highest complexities is shown by
COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008).
In early times, games were sometimes played offline and an operator entered the
data on the decisions made by the participants into a computer at the end of each
round (Feldstein 1986; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978). Today, participants
normally enter their data online (Cromwell et al. 1998; Flessa 2001; Hans and Nieberg
2007; Hofweber 1987; Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001).
The only internet-based hospital game, COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008),
can be played either centralized in one room (e.g., PC laboratory) or decentralized in
different locations to overcome locational and temporal restrictions in which the play-
ers cannot communicate face to face (e.g., different PC laboratories, PCs at work or
home).
In hospital management games, the players representing one hospital compete either
directly (Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Rauner et al. 2008) or indirectly
(Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Hans and Nieberg 2007; Hofweber
1987; Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001) with the players
representing other hospitals. In the case of indirect competition, players are only evalu-
ated by their performance regarding predefined criteria, while in the situation of direct
competition players’ decisions affect performance of other hospitals as in a real-world
environment. For example in HOSPSIM (Knotts et al. 1982) and CHESS (Knotts et al.
1989), the participants compete for physicians who are attracted to working in hospi-
tals with higher quality of care. In COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008), the
hospital players compete both for budget and patients within a reimbursement system
of limited regional budgets.
The gaming process involves the considerations of a game host, the decision mak-
ing of the players, and the evaluation of results after each period/round. Several games
(e.g., Rauner et al. 2008; Schwarz 1992) have a game host who can vary both internal
conditions (e.g., number of beds, number of operating rooms, number and type of
radiology machines) and external conditions (e.g., reimbursement system, purchasing
markets, job markets).
For a number of multiple periods/rounds, players can make decisions on different
levels (e.g., strategic, tactical, operational) and in different areas pertaining to resource,
process, and financial management. The length of a period varies from years (Hans
and Nieberg 2007; Meredith 1978), quarters (Cromwell et al. 1998; Flessa 2001;
Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998), months (Hofweber 1987;
Rauner et al. 2008), 2 weeks (Schwarz 1992), 1 week (Hans and Nieberg 2007), to
1 day (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Warnke 2001). The more operational a hospital game
is, the shorter the length of the periods. For example, week-oriented games, such as
ASTERIKS (Schwarz 1992), focus on operational staff and patient scheduling issues.
In the OPERATING ROOM MANAGER GAME (Hans and Nieberg 2007), three
management rounds are played using different periods of one year, one week and one
day. Each round represents a managerial level from the top (strategic/tactical) level
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(task: capacity dimensioning and capacity allocation to specialities), over the inter-
mediate (tactical/operational) (task: scheduling elective patients) to the bottom (oper-
ational) level (task: simulation of online scheduling). This game can be used perfectly
to teach operating room scheduling techniques (Cardoen et al. 2009; Velásquez Flores
2008).
The evaluation of results usually takes place after each period/round (with the
exception of Feldstein (1986)) so that the players can take the opportunity to improve
their decision making with the new information gained. The players receive reports on
performance measures in resource, process, and financial management. Furthermore,
hospital mission-related performance measures (e.g., quality of care, staff satisfaction)
are often provided to the players. In two games (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Schwandt
1998), players or the game host evaluate overall results of the hospitals by Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA).
2.2 Application area
The main application area for hospital management games is teaching. However, they
can also be used for policy purposes to illustrate how regulations impact decision
making and outcomes. Some games are also developed for improving research. For
example, Rauner et al. (2008) intend to investigate COREMAIN HOSPITAL in detail
by experimental economics with both teaching (e.g., game situation) and policy pur-
poses (e.g., impact of reimbursement systems). By analyzing reimbursement systems,
the basics of principle-agent theory can be explained to the players (Zweifel et al.
2005).
2.3 Target player groups
Hospital management games are developed for different target player groups such
as health care leaders/policy makers, health care practitioners/professionals, hospitals
staff (e.g., doctors, nurses, medical staff, technical staff, administrative, and manage-
ment staff), and students of different majors (e.g., management/economics, medicine,
and nursing). All games are designed to be played by hospital staff as well as eco-
nomics, management, and medical students (cf. Table 2). Strategic-oriented general
games are more suitable for health care leaders/policy makers and health care practi-
tioners/professionals such as in Feldstein (1986), Meyer (1982), Rauner et al. (2008),
Schwandt (1998), while functional games might be of special interest for hospital staff
of a particular departments (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Hofweber 1987; Warnke 2001).
2.4 Decision making
Regarding decision making, hospital management games have a different game focus
due to their emphasis on resource, process, and/or financial management in the con-
text of the external hospital environment (e.g., legal/political conditions, competi-
tion, purchasing markets, and job markets). This determines the simulation language
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(Brennan et al. 2006; Cooper et al. 2007; Pidd 2004) and other OR techniques used
(Ozcan 2009). In several games, players can define the mission of the hospital at the
beginning of the game, while players decide on resource, process, and/or financial
management during all games.
2.4.1 Game focus
We distinguish three hospital management game categories for decision making: (1)
resource and financial management focused games (Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001;
Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982; Schwandt
1998), (2) resource and process management focused games (Hans and Nieberg 2007;
Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001), and (3) resource, process, and financial management
focused games (Cromwell et al. 1998; Rauner et al. 2008). Early games contain few
player decisions due to computational limitations. The more recent the games, the
more decision requirements are generally included.
Group 1: Resource and financial management focused games define structure qual-
ity as a main factor that determines the outcome. The hospital processes are modeled
as a black-box using equation-based techniques neglecting queuing of patients for
services (Feldstein 1986; Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978;
Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998). All games of this group do not account for staff sched-
uling and only (Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998) include
for admission and/or discharge planning of patients. Early general hospital manage-
ment games focus on resource and financial management with a few strategic/tactical
management decisions (e.g., HOSPSIM (Knotts et al. 1982) for US, CHESS (Knotts
et al. 1989) for Canada, and THE HOSPITAL GAME (Meredith 1978) for US). The
STRATEGIC PLANNING GAME (Feldstein 1986) emphasizes strategic issues and
thus only admission planning is included for investigating financial consequences.
KLIMA (Meyer 1982) and KLIMA FORTE (Schwandt 1998) can be categorized as
general hospital management games on the strategic/tactical level. Thus, process man-
agement is of less importance. Players plan resources and should detect bottlenecks.
Using cause-effect-curves, quality and costs of treatment/care of patients are calcu-
lated. MOSHI (Flessa 2001) is characterized by its special focus on training health
care managers to efficiently and effectively allocate key financial resources of a cleri-
cal hospital in Tanzania. It illustrates the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on scarce
hospital resources and even models this epidemic by system dynamics. An example
for a functional hospital game is ARKTIS (Hofweber 1987) which models purchasing
strategies in pharmacies.
Group 2: Resource and process management focused games consider process qual-
ity as an additional contribution to outcome quality. As process management con-
tains more operational decisions, it requires discrete event simulation for queuing of
patients (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001). These games model
resource management to plan the availability of human and non-human resources.
To limit the number of decisions and guarantee playability in a training course of a
few days, such games restrict decisions in financial management to a minimum. The
general hospital game ASTERIKS (Schwarz 1992) places emphasis on operational
123
576 M. Kraus et al.
process management with a special focus on queuing of patients and staff scheduling,
not including staff rostering. This demands for discrete event simulation. Only key,
crucial costs of resources are considered, while all other costs are calculated by a simple
black-box algorithm. PRIMA KLINIK (Warnke 2001) is a successor of ASTERIKS
(Schwarz 1992), and in the former game players can be responsible for managing
either single departments or an entire hospital with the advantage of harmonizing pro-
cess management of all the departments involved. It uses discrete event simulation.
The OPERATING ROOM MANAGER GAME (Hans and Nieberg 2007) belongs to
the group of functional hospital games with a main focus on process management
in operating rooms with few resource management decisions include considerations
of overtime and only some financial investment decisions. From strategic choices on
capacities for an upcoming year to online planning of actual surgeries in each operat-
ing room, many functions of managing a surgery department can be experienced by
the players. This again calls for discrete event simulation.
Group 3: Resource, process, and financial management focused games focus on struc-
ture, process quality, and account for reimbursement (Cromwell et al. 1998; Rauner
et al. 2008). As a result, discrete event simulation for modeling patient flows is needed
as in the rather simple general hospital management game DRAGON (Cromwell et al.
1998). For financial management, admission and discharge planning of inpatients
together with efficient and effective resource and process management are of high
importance in COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008). The game accounts
for different reimbursement systems, which makes the game unique and useable in
countries with differing reimbursement systems.
2.4.2 Hospital mission
General strategic hospital goals can be defined and prioritized in many games (Flessa
2001; Hofweber 1987; Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt
1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001) depending on the game focus, mostly before peri-
odic decision making starts. This game feature is essential because in practice decision
makers of hospitals also have to define their mission (e.g., quality of treatment/care,
patient satisfaction, occupancy rate, dismissal rate, length of stay, costs, liquidity).
The mission set often remains constant for the whole duration of the game. Thus,
players have to account for the mission in the entire decision making process. It is
only in COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008) that the hospitals’ mission can
be changed once.
2.4.3 Resource management
Explanation of forecasting, developing, and controlling resources (Ozcan 2009) plays
a key role in hospital management games. All games account for resource manage-
ment decisions which can be categorized threefold: (1) capacity planning, (2) service
planning, and (3) staff and non-staff resource allocation.
2.4.3.1. Capacity planning All hospital management games illustrate the crucial role
of human and non-human capacity management. A shortage of capacities slows
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down processes, prolongs waiting for patients, increases the workload and stress
of staff, lowers quality of treatment/care, and may therefore also increase costs.
Enough resources have to be available especially for emergency patients and/or unex-
pected events. Operations Research techniques support optimizing nurse scheduling
(e.g., full-time/part time nurses) (Burke et al. 2004), queuing layout (e.g., sin-
gle/multiple equipments/rooms) (Ozcan 2009; Pidd 2004; Vissers and Beech 2005),
and stock-keeping (e.g., number of patients in beds) (Ozcan 2009; Pidd 2004; Vissers
and Beech 2005).
In a hospital, the most precious and the most delicate resources are in fact human
resources, because about two thirds of hospital operating costs result from payroll
expenses. Most hospital management games provide for different staff groups such as
medical doctors or nurses (Flessa 2001; Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989;
Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001)
(cf. Table 3). Only four games (Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Hans and
Nieberg 2007; Meredith 1978) simulate an aggregated human resource planning pro-
cess. For example, players of the OPERATING ROOM MANAGER GAME (Hans
and Nieberg 2007) decide on the staffing of operating rooms, while players of THE
HOSPITAL GAME (Meredith 1978) choose the staffing level of the entire hospital
which is expressed in the number of patient days.
Players also determine staff overtime in five games (Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008;
Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001). For example, in COREMAIN HOS-
PITAL (Rauner et al. 2008), KLIMA FORTE (Schwandt 1998), and PRIMA KLINIK
(Warnke 2001) an excessive staff workload negatively influences quality of care.
The situation on job markets (e.g., shortage of nurses) and legal restrictions (e.g.,
notice period) affect human resource planning as well. In seven games (Flessa 2001;
Hofweber 1987; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992;
Warnke 2001), hired staff is available and fired staff is dismissed after a certain
delay.
In the majority of the games, non-human resources are managed by the players
(e.g., beds, equipment, building/rooms, therapeutic and diagnostic procedures/service
capacities, additional agencies/centers/clinics/facilities) as shown in Table 4.
Hospital management games aim at training participants in decision making for dif-
ferent hospital types and sizes. The number of hospital beds is normally predefined,
except in Cromwell et al. (1998), Feldstein (1986), Knotts et al. (1982), Knotts et al.
(1989), Meredith (1978). Emergency beds are only planned in four games (Meredith
1978; Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992).
Furthermore, several games illustrate consequences of decisions on equipment
(Hofweber 1987; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992;
Warnke 2001) and building/room planning (Feldstein 1986; Hans and Nieberg 2007;
Rauner et al. 2008; Warnke 2001). In DRAGON (Cromwell et al. 1998), partici-
pants can open a pre-admission clinic, while in the STRATEGIC PLANNING GAME
(Feldstein 1986) skilled nursing facilities, freestanding ambulatory care clinics, resi-
dential senior citizen retirement centres, and home health agencies can be constructed
as inpatient satellite facilities.
For example, in COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008) and PRIMA KLINIK
(Warnke 2001), players can purchase or close down radiology machines to cope with
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Table 5 Service planning
Service planning Hans and
Nieberg
(2007)
Hofweber
(1987)
Meyer
(1982),
Schwandt
(1998)
Rauner
et al.
(2008),
Warnke
(2001)
Schwarz
(1992)
Laboratory department
planning
X
Nursing department
planning
X X
Operating room planning X X X
Pharmacy department
planning
X
Radiology room planning X X
the radiology’s department workload. In COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008)
players can choose among different technologies and conduct technology assessment
(cf. Gold et al. 1996). KLIMA (Meyer 1982), KLIMA FORTE (Schwandt 1998), and
ASTERIKS (Schwarz 1992) allow for investing in additional laboratory and radiology
machines. In OPERATING ROOM MANAGER GAME (Hans and Nieberg 2007),
COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008), and PRIMA KLINIK (Warnke 2001),
players also decide on opening or closing operating rooms.
2.4.3.2. Service planning After deciding on human and non-human resource capaci-
ties, players work out service planning. They determine opening hours for departments
and emergency capacities (cf. Table 5). Three games (Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998;
Schwarz 1992) allow for the blockage a certain percentage of bed capacity/a certain
number of beds for emergency patients. In four games (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Rauner
et al. 2008; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001), players can reserve one operating room for
emergency patients only. Players of the OPERATING ROOM MANAGER GAME
(Hans and Nieberg 2007) assign the available operating room capacity to inpatient,
outpatient, and emergency rooms.
2.4.3.3. Staff and non-staff resource allocation Mainly hospital management games
with a focus on process management (groups 2 and 3) account for staff and non-staff
resource allocation (cf. Table 6). This decision creates the pre-conditions for detailed
process management, especially queuing of patients for radiology examinations/sur-
gery as well as treatment, and staff scheduling.
For example, ASTERIKS (Schwarz 1992) focuses on resource allocation in the
radiology department. Players assign radiology assistants and radiology machines
to a predefined number of available radiology rooms. In the OPERATING ROOM
MANAGER GAME (Hans and Nieberg 2007), participants allocate inpatient oper-
ating room capacity to specializations. PRIMA KLINK (Warnke 2001) incorporates
resource allocation decisions in the radiology and surgery departments.
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Table 6 Staff and non-staff resource allocation
Hans and
Nieberg
(2007)
Hofweber
(1987)
Rauner
et al.
(2008)
Schwandt
(1998)
Schwarz
(1992)
Warnke
(2001)
Staff resource allocation
Operating room teams X
Pharmacists X
Pharmaceutical assistants X
Pharmaceutical aids X
Radiology assistants X
Non-staff resource allocation
Bed allocation to
specialties
X
Inpatient operating
room allocation to
specialties
X X
Radiology machines
allocation to
radiology rooms
X X
2.4.4 Process management
The hospital management games of groups 2 and 3 (Cromwell et al. 1998; Hans and
Nieberg 2007; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001) focus on decisions
regarding process management with the inclusion of resource management consider-
ations (cf. Table 7). The games of group 1 either neglect patient scheduling (Hofweber
1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978) or only account for admission and/or
discharge planning of patients (Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Meyer 1982; Schwandt
1998) as they have a more general financial-management oriented focus. All games
of group 1 (Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989;
Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982; Schwandt 1998) do not account for staff scheduling.
Admission and discharge planning play a key role in managing a hospital well
and have to be adjusted with the availability of resources such as beds, operat-
ing room capacity, and staff capacity. However, hospital management might opti-
mize reimbursement by choosing suitable admission and discharge strategies as
explained in detail in the section on financial management. Through hospital games,
agency/game theory can be taught using the example of hospital reimbursement
systems (Zweifel et al. 2005). Players are responsible for admission planning in five
games (Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz
1992) and for discharge planning in three games (Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008;
Schwandt 1998). For example, in the case of full occupation players of MOSHI (Flessa
2001) can reject potential patients. Only in Rauner et al. (2008), Schwarz (1992) par-
ticipants schedule admission of patients by using prioritizing rules.
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Table 7 Patient and staff scheduling
Cromwell et al.
(1998), Hans and
Nieberg (2007)
Feldstein
(1986),
Flessa (2001)
Meyer
(1982)
Rauner et al.
(2008)
Schwandt
(1998)
Schwarz
(1992)
Warnke
(2001)
Patient scheduling
Admission planning X X X X
Care planning X X
Queue planning for services
Laboratory department X
Radiology department X X X
Surgery department X X X X
Discharge planning X X X
Staff scheduling
Operating room teams X X
Doctors X
Assistant doctors X
Nurses X X
Radiology assistants X X
After the patient is admitted, care/treatment is planned in only two games of group
2 (Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001). The queuing of patients for services (e.g., labora-
tory, radiology, surgery) is considered in games of group 2 and 3 (Cromwell et al.
1998; Hans and Nieberg 2007; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001). For
example, participants of Rauner et al. (2008), Schwarz (1992), Warnke (2001) study
different queuing strategies for radiology patients. First, players define priority sched-
uling rules. Second, players determine the queuing type (one queue for each machine
or one queue for each type of radiology examination). In the surgery department,
players of Cromwell et al. (1998), Hans and Nieberg (2007), Rauner et al. (2008),
Schwarz (1992), Warnke (2001) only choose suitable priority rules (e.g., patients with
shortest surgery time first, patients with previously postponed surgery first). In this
way, players learn the basics of general queuing theory (Winston and Goldberg 2003)
and priority scheduling rules (Pinedo 2008).
Apart from patient scheduling, staff scheduling is another key aspect of process
management in a hospital. Nurse scheduling has attracted a lot of attention in the
scientific literature (Burke et al. 2004). However, only some of the games in group
2 and 3 included this essential decision making task. In two games (Schwarz 1992;
Warnke 2001), participants develop a detailed work schedule for nurses. In addition,
players of Rauner et al. (2008), Schwarz (1992) investigate different schedule strate-
gies for operating room teams and radiology assistants.
2.4.5 Financial management
The third main target of hospital management games comprises efficient and effective
planning of scarce financial resources and this is included in all three game groups with
a different level of complexity. Successful financial management is highly dependent
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Table 8 Planning cash outflow for assets
Feldstein
(1986)
Hans and
Nieberg
(2007)
Hofweber
(1987)
Meredith
(1978)
Meyer
(1982),
Schwandt
(1998)
Rauner et al.
(2008)
Schwarz
(1992)
Warnke
(2001)
Equipment
Computer systems X
Diagnostic devices X
Laboratory machines X X
Pharmaceutical machines X
Radiology machines X X X X
Buildings/rooms
Physicians’ office
buildings
X
Radiology rooms X
Operating rooms X X X
Financial investments X X
on appropriate resource management. For hospital games, financial management deci-
sions are twofold: (1) decisions on cash outflows and (2) decisions on cash inflows.
2.4.5.1. Cash outflows In the vast majority of the hospital games, players decide on
cash outflows for assets and expenditures. Few games consider optimizing strategies
for purchasing material or pharmaceuticals.
Planning cash outflows for assets (equipment, buildings/rooms, and financial invest-
ments) is incorporated in two-thirds of the games (cf. Table 8). To deal with the demand
for radiology examinations, players can purchase additional radiology machines in
Meyer (1982), Rauner et al. (2008), Schwandt (1998), Schwarz (1992), Warnke (2001)
and diagnostic devices in Meyer (1982), Schwandt (1998). Laboratory machines
can be bought in Meyer (1982), Schwandt (1998), Schwarz (1992). In ARKTIS
(Hofweber 1987) players can also invest in computer systems and pharmaceutical
machines. However, additional machines not only cause investment costs, but also
running costs that burden the restricted hospital budget. Only players of THE STRA-
TEGIC MANAGEMENT GAME (Feldstein 1986) can invest in physicians’ office
building and players of PRIMA KLINIK (Warnke 2001) can open an additional radi-
ology room, whilst players of Hans and Nieberg (2007), Rauner et al. (2008), Warnke
(2001) can build additional operating rooms.
Planning cash outflows for expenditures (cf. Table 9) is a major task in KLIMA
FORTE (Schwandt 1998). In a couple of games (Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Rauner
et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Warnke 2001), participants plan the budget for staff
education/qualification/training programs as well as for staff gratification/motivation
strategies because well-educated and highly-motivated staff is vital for the quality
of care. In five games (Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Meyer 1982; Rauner
et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998), players can purchase hospital market information includ-
ing the information about competitors. In MOSHI (Flessa 2001), players determine
the amount spent for medical material, can participate in a preventive maintenance
program, and can spend financial resources on AIDS-prevention. THE HOSPITAL
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GAME (Meredith 1978) considers expenditures for paying back loans/mortgages.
Further budget planning issues deal with the determination of expenditures for pro-
motion in Feldstein (1986) and for housekeeping and maintenance in Knotts et al.
(1982, 1989).
Three games allow for the planning of the purchasing strategy to reduce expendi-
tures for materials and pharmaceuticals (Flessa 2001; Hofweber 1987; Meyer 1982).
In MOSHI (Flessa 2001), all participants can jointly run a central pharmacy for drug
supply in order to lower costs. Players of ARKTIS (Hofweber 1987) select suppliers
and negotiate prices with pharmaceuticals. These are again game theory situations
(Zweifel et al. 2005). In KLIMA (Meyer 1982), participants can choose whether or
not (medical) materials should be purchased externally.
2.4.5.2. Cash inflows Cash inflow planning is a key issue for the financial management
of hospitals and is thus included in about half of the games (cf. Table 10). The games
in group 2 (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001) neglect this issue
as they focus on detailed scheduling. We distinguish the following: (1) reimbursement
(2) service charges, (3) donations, (4) revenues from financial investments, and (5) the
raising of external financial capital.
The insurance status of patients and the reimbursement systems of hospitals differ
among countries (cf. Leidl 1998) which highly affect admission and discharge planning
(cf. Rauner and Schaffhauser-Linzatti 2001, 2002; Leonard et al. 2003; Rauner et al.
2003; Schaffhauser-Linzatti et al. 2009). Consequently, hospital management games
are mostly applicable to the country and its reimbursement system for which they have
been developed. The only exception is COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008)
which accounts for the three main different reimbursement systems used worldwide
(day-based reimbursement, DRG-based reimbursement, and global budgets).
For example, DRG-like reimbursement systems favor lucrative patient categories
and force hospital management to discharge patients earlier than their day-based coun-
terpart (cf. Leidl 1998). With the implementation of DRG systems in many European
countries in the late 1990’s, reimbursement-oriented hospital management games
emerged (Cromwell et al. 1998; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998).
In Rauner et al. (2008), Schwandt (1998), players can place higher priority on the
admittance of lucrative patient categories. In three games (Meyer 1982; Rauner et al.
2008; Schwandt 1998), players also plan discharges. For example, in COREMAIN
HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008), players experience how the length of stay of patients
influences reimbursement. In two games (Cromwell et al. 1998; Rauner et al. 2008),
players can misqualify patients’ DRG categories to increase revenue. However, a high
misqualification rate might be discovered by a regulatory agency in COREMAIN
HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008). Then, players will have to pay a penalty as in
reality. Again, here the basics of agency theory can be taught to students (Zweifel
et al. 2005).
Cash inflows for reimbursement, services charges, and donations are found
in few hospital management games. In the STRATEGIC PLANNING GAME
(Feldstein 1986), the participants fix the charges for ambulatory care clinic visits,
health care agency visits, and senior citizen retirement center rents. In MOSHI (Flessa
2001), participants determine the charge for inpatient bed days and can request dona-
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Table 10 Cash inflows
Cromwell
et al.
(1998)
Feldstein
(1986)
Flessa
(2001)
Meredith
(1978)
Meyer
(1982)
Rauner
et al.
(2008)
Schwandt
(1998)
Reimbursement
Patient insurance system
Admission planning X
Price determination for not
Medicaid-, Medicare-,
BlueCross-reimbursed
patients
X
Price
determination
for private
patients/services
X X
Patient payment system
Admission planning X X
Discharge planning X X X
DRG-coding X
DRG-creep X
Service charges
Charge determination
for ambulatory care
clinic visits
X
Charge determination
for health care agency
visits
X
Charge determination
for inpatient bed days
X
Rental charge
determination for
senior citizen
retirement centers
X
Charge determination
for rooms
X
Donations X
Revenues from financial
investments
X X
Raising of external
financial capital
X
tions. The players of THE HOSPITAL GAME (Meredith 1978) set room rates which
affect the demand of patients for hospital services. Only two games (Feldstein 1986;
Meredith 1978) account for revenues from financial investments as mentioned earlier.
In the STRATEGIC PLANNING GAME (Feldstein 1986), the raising of external
financial capital can be planned by the players.
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Table 11 OR techniques used in hospital management games
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Legal/Political
Conditions
Agency/Game Theory, System 
Dynamics 
Flessa 2001; Hofweber 1987; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992 
Competition Agency/Game Theory, System 
Dynamics 
Knotts et al 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Rauner et al. 2008 
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2.5 Operations research techniques used
OR techniques are involved in modelling both the internal and external environments
of hospitals and to facilitate the decision making of the players as shown in Table 11.
Two games (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Schwandt 1998) even conduct a DEA and are
thus especially suitable for illustrating the potential of DEA to players (O’Neill et al.
2008; Ozcan 2008).
Interplay and interdependencies among all decisions and environments of hospitals
can be described to all players (Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001;
Hans and Nieberg 2007; Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978;
Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001) by
system dynamics (cf. Brennan et al. 2006; Cooper et al. 2007). Agency/game theory
(Zweifel et al. 2005) is relevant for decisions on financial management in all games
(Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Hans and Nieberg 2007; Hofweber
1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008;
Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001). Especially, optimal admission and
discharge strategies for patients improve reimbursement (Leonard et al. 2003; Rauner
et al. 2003; Rauner and Schaffhauser-Linzatti 2001, 2002; Schaffhauser-Linzatti et al.
2009).
For all games (Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Hans and Nieberg
2007; Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982; Rauner
et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001), decision making rules and
forecasting (Ozcan 2009) are essential methods for capacity and service planning as
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well as financial management. Players also conduct technology assessment (Cromwell
et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Hans and Nieberg 2007; Hofweber 1987;
Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt
1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001) for capacity and expenditure planning to evaluate
cost-effectiveness for equipment, machines, material, and pharmaceuticals etc., (Gold
et al. 1996). Once resources are allocated, assignment theory gains importance for
some games (Hans and Nieberg 2007; Hofweber 1987; Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt
1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001).
A group of games focuses on process and resource management and thus
discrete event simulation is required (e.g., Rauner et al. 2008; Schwarz 1992; Warnke
2001). Other non-process oriented hospital games use a very high number of equa-
tions to model the system which also makes results unforeseeable (e.g., Meyer 1982;
Schwandt 1998). Players of Cromwell et al. (1998), Feldstein (1986), Flessa (2001),
Hans and Nieberg (2007), Meyer (1982), Rauner et al. (2008), Schwandt (1998),
Schwarz (1992), Warnke (2001) can be taught the basics of queuing, priority rules, and
different simulation approaches (system dynamics, discrete event simulation, agent-
based simulation) (Brennan et al. 2006; Cooper et al. 2007; Ozcan 2009; Pidd 2004;
Vissers and Beech 2005).
Simulation languages used in hospital management games evolved from Turbo
Basic (Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978); Turbo Pascal (Cromwell et al. 1998;
Flessa 2001; Meyer 1982; Schwarz 1992); Delphi using Paradox database (Schwandt
1998; Warnke 2001) to Excel, Delphi, and Tecnomatix EMPower /Tecnomatix Plant
Simulation (Hans and Nieberg 2007). COREMAIN HOSPITAL (Rauner et al. 2008)
uses discrete event simulation in C# and ASP.NET 2.0 Web Programming Framework
is realized using a distributed server-centric web application with four tiers which
contains: (1) client, (2) web-server, (3) application server, and (4) database server.
All simulation events and decisions of players are stored in a database for further
evaluation which is unique to this game.
Stock-keeping issues (Cromwell et al. 1998; Feldstein 1986; Flessa 2001; Hans and
Nieberg 2007; Hofweber 1987; Knotts et al. 1982, 1989; Meredith 1978; Meyer 1982;
Rauner et al. 2008; Schwandt 1998; Schwarz 1992; Warnke 2001) are involved in
capacity planning and patient scheduling (Pidd 2004; Vissers and Beech 2005; Ozcan
2009). Operating room management (Cardoen et al. 2009; Velásquez Flores 2008) is
illustrated in detail by Hans and Nieberg (2007). Once the working hours of staff are
planned, staff scheduling approaches are needed (Rauner et al. 2008; Schwarz 1992;
Warnke 2001). None of the games includes staff rostering.
3 Conclusion
OR and management games have gained importance to better plan for scarce resources.
Policy makers, practitioners, and students can study the reality in an artificial setting
such as a hospital, with high learning effects. The internet has opened new possibilities
to overcome the distance and time problem by bringing together participants from all
over the world. This is especially essential in times of tight budgets, growing health
care demand, and increasing technology costs.
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Hospital management games focus differently on resource, process, and finan-
cial management. The games concentrate either on: (1) resource and financial, (2)
resource and process, or (3) resource, process, and financial management decisions.
Furthermore, several games also account for the influence of the external environment
on hospitals. Different OR techniques have been applied (e.g., agency/game theory,
assignment problem, data envelopment analysis, discrete-event simulation, priority
rules, staff scheduling, stock-keeping, system dynamics). OR techniques also facili-
tate the decision making of players such as decision making theory, forecasting, and
technology assessment.
OR methods are not only used to simulate gaming situations but at the same time
are the subject of teaching. In addition, the potential of OR can be illustrated to policy
makers and practitioners. This may reduces their reservations and make them more
open to the promotion of OR applications in practice.
Thus, comprehensive internet-based hospital games such as COREMAIN HOSPI-
TAL (Rauner et al. 2008) that account for the interplay of internal resource, process,
and financial management with the external environment of hospitals are most promis-
ing. Furthermore, experimental economics can be applied to investigate both teaching
(e.g., game situation) and policy issues (e.g., impact of reimbursement systems) in the
future.
Acknowledgments The authors thank the two referees for their helpful comments.
References
Becker O, Feit T, Hofer V, Leopold-Wildburger U, Selten R (2007) Educational effects in an experiment
with the management game SINTO-Market. Cent Eur J Oper Res 15:301–308
Blakely G, Skirton H, Cooper S, Allum P, Nelmes P (2009) Educational gaming in the health sciences:
systematic review. J Adv Nurs 65:259–269
Bochennek K, Wittekindt B, Zimmermann SY, Klingebiel T (2007) More than mere games: a review of
card and board games for medical education. Med Teach 29:941–948
Bradley P (2006) The history of simulation in medical education and possible future directions. Med Edu
40:254–262
Brandl B, Leopold-Wildburger U, Mietek A, Pickl S (2010) How do commission rates influence a firm’s
success? Statistical analysis of some corporate strategy simulation experiments. Cent Eur J Oper
Res 18. doi:10.1007/s10100-010-0176-1
Brennan A, Chick SE, Davies R (2006) A taxonomy of model structures for economic evaluation of health
technologies. Health Econ 15:1295–1310
Burke EK, De Causmaecker P, Vanden Berghe G, Van Landegheme H (2004) The state of the art of nurse
rostering. J Sched 7:441–499
Cardoen B, Demeulemeester E, Beliën J (2009) Operating room planning and scheduling: a literature review.
Report, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Cooper K, Davies R, Brailsford S (2007) Choice of modelling technique for evaluating health care inter-
ventions. J Oper Res Soc 58:168–176
Dasgupta S (2003) Guest editorial: internet-mediated simulation and gaming. Simul Gaming 34:8–9
Dempsey J, Haynes L, Lucassen B, Casey M (2002) Forty simple computer games and what they could
mean to educators. Simul Gaming 33:157–168
Dieleman H, Huisingh D (2006) Games by which to learn and teach about sustainable development: explor-
ing the relevance of games and experiential learning for sustainability. J Clean Prod 14:837–847
Elder SB, Gregory C (1996) The “Lactation Game”: an innovative teaching method for health care profes-
sionals. J Hum Lact 12:137–138
Faria AJ, Dickinson JR (1994) Simulation gaming for sales management training. J Manag Dev 13:47–59
123
590 M. Kraus et al.
Faria AJ, Wellington WJ (2004) A survey of simulation game users, former-users, and never-users. Simul
Gaming 35:178–207
Gaba DM, Howard SK, Fish KJ, Smith BE, Sowb YA (2001) Simulation-based training in anesthesia crisis
resource management (ACRM): a decade of experience. Simul Gaming 32:175–193
Gold MR, Siegel JE, Russell LB, Weinstein MC (1996) Cost-effectiveness in health and medicine. Oxford
University Press, New York/Oxford
Hoffman SB, Brand FR, Beatty PG, Hamill LA (1985) Geriatrix: a role-playing game. Gerontologist
25:568–572
Kibbee J, Craft C, Nanus B (1961) Management games—a new technique for executive development.
Reinhold Publishing Corporation, New York
Koller H (1974) Planspieltechnik. In: Faßhauer R, Wurzbacher W (eds) Unternehmensspiele—Stand und
Entwicklungstendenzen, Stuttgart pp 11
Lane DC (1995) On a resurgence of management simulations and games. J Oper Res Soc 46:604–625
Leidl R (ed) (1998) Health care and its financing in the single European market. IOS Press, Amsterdam
Leonard KJ, Rauner MS, Schaffhauser-Linzatti MM, Yap R (2003) The effect of funding policy on day
of week admissions and discharges in hospitals: the cases of Canada and Austria. Health Policy
63:239–257
Morton PG, Tarvin L (2001) The pain game: pain assessment, management and related JCAHO Standards.
J Contin Edu Nurs 32:223–227
Mulcahy E, Unger L, Frieder P, Reisman A, Kulkarni S, Mathur K (1981) A computerized instrument for
practice management instruction. Proc Ann Sym Comput Appl Med Care Novemb 4:702–705
Nehring WM, Ellis WE, Lashley FR (2001) Human patient simulators in nursing education: an overview.
Simul Gaming 32:194–204
Ogershok PR, Cottrell S (2004) The pediatric board game. Med Teach 26:514–517
O’Neill L, Rauner MS, Heidenberger K, Kraus M (2008) A cross-national comparison and taxonomy of
hospital efficiency studies using data envelopment analysis. Socio-Econ Plan Sci 42:158–189
Ozcan YA (2008) Health care benchmarking and performance evaluation: an assessment using data envel-
opment analysis (DEA). Springer, Newton
Ozcan YA (2009) Quantitative methods in health care management: techniques and applications, 2nd edn.
Jossey-Bass/wiley, San Francisco
Panosch B (2008) Management games: a powerful tool to teach competence and knowledge? Master Thesis.
University of Vienna
Peters V, Vissers G, Heijne G (1998) The validity of games. Simul Gaming 29:20–30
Pidd M (2004) Computer simulation in management science. Wiley, Chichester
Pinedo M (2008) Scheduling: theory, algorithms, and systems, 3rd edn. Springer, Newton
Rau E (2005) Combat science: the emergence of operational research in world war II. Endeavour 29:156–
161
Rauner MS, Schaffhauser-Linzatti MM (2001) Interplay between in-patient reimbursement systems and
healthcare technology management: the Austrian case. Int J Healthc Technol Manag 3:1–23
Rauner MS, Schaffhauser-Linzatti MM (2002) Impact of international in-patient payment strategies on
health technology management: a system-dynamics-model for Austria. Socio-Econ Plan Sci 36:133–
154
Rauner MS, Zeileis A, Schaffhauser-Linzatti MM, Hornik K (2003) Modelling the effects of the Austrian
inpatient reimbursement system on length-of-stay distributions. OR-Spectrum 25:183–206
Reisman A, Emmons H, Morito S, Rivaud J, Green EJ (1977) Dental practice management game: a new
tool for teaching practice management. J Dent Edu 41:262–267
Rohn WE (1995) Ursprung und Entwicklung des Planspiels. In: Geilhardt T, Muehlbradt T (eds) Planspiele
im Personal—und Organisationsmanagement. Verlag fuer Angewandte Psychologie, Goettingen pp
57–68
Schaffhauser-Linzatti MM, Zeileis A, Rauner M (2009) Effects of the Austrian performance-oriented inpa-
tient reimbursement system on treatment patterns: illustrated on cases with knee-joint problems. Cent
Eur J Oper Res 17:293–314
Schweinhammer J (2008) Strategische Bedeutung und Entwicklung eines hilfebezogenen Interaktionsde-
signs fuer das Krankenhausplanspiel COREmain Hospital. Master Thesis. University of Vienna
Velásquez Flores JR (2008) Hierarchical muli-cirteria operating theatre-scheduling: solving the tactical,
operational and online planning problems with mathematical programming. Der Andere Verlag,
Toenning, Luebeck, Marburg
123
Hospital management games: a taxonomy and extensive review 591
Vissers J, Beech R (eds) (2005) Health operations management: patient flow logistics in health care (Routl-
edge Health Management). Routledge Chapman and Hall, New York
Watson H, Blackstone J (1981) Computer simulation, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York
Winston WL, Goldberg JB (2003) Operations research: applications and algorithms, 4th edn. Thomson
Brooks/Cole, Belmont
Zweifel P, Breyer F, Kifmann M (2005) Gesundheitsoekonomie, 5th edn. Springer, Berlin
References for the Taxonomy of Hospital Management Games
Cromwell DA, Priddis D, Hindle D (1998) Using simulation to educate hospital staff about casemix. Health
Care Manag Sci 1998:87–93
Feldstein PJ (1986) The strategic planning game: a computer game for health care administrators. J Health
Adm Edu 4:67–75
Flessa S (2001) MOSHI: a culture-tailored management game for African hospital managers. Trop Doc
31:144–146
Hans EW, Nieberg T (2007) Operating room manager game. INFORMS Trans on Edu 8:25–36
Hofweber P (1987) Arzneimittelversorgung im Krankenhaus: Das Managementplanspiel ARKTIS.
Zeitschrift fuer oeffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen 10:433–446
Knotts US, Parrish LC, Harrison JF (1982) a hospital simulator (HOSPSIM): A report of the model and
results expected from field testing. Dev Bus Simul Exp Exerc 9:33–37
Knotts US, Parrish LC, Caro DHJ (1989) The Canadian hospital executive simulation system (CHESS).
Dev Bus Simul Exp Exerc 16:5–9
Meredith J (1978) The hospital game. Shasta Publications, Tahoe Terrace Cincinnati
Meyer M (1982) Elucidating administrative decision making in hospitals: a hospital management game.
Simul Gaming 13:63–72
Rauner MS, Kraus M, Schwarz S (2008) Competition under different reimbursement systems: the concept
of an internet-based hospital management game. Eur J Oper Res 185:948–963
Schwandt M (1998) Entwicklung eines Planspiels zum Klinikmanagement mit Fallpauschalen-orientierter
Finanzierung: KLIMA FORTE. Dissertation. University of Erlangen-Nuernberg
Schwarz S (1992) Asteriks—a management game for hospitals. J Soc Health Syst 3:5–14
Warnke S (2001) Entwicklung eines Systems computergestuetzter Planspiele zum Prozessmanagement im
Krankenhaus. Dissertation, University of Erlangen-Nuernberg
123
  
A2 
 
European Journal of Operational Research 185 (2008) 948–963
www.elsevier.com/locate/ejorCompetition under diﬀerent reimbursement systems:
The concept of an internet-based hospital management game
Marion S. Rauner a,*, Markus Kraus b, Sigrun Schwarz c
a University of Vienna, School of Business, Economics and Statistics, Department of Innovation and Technology Management,
Bruenner Str. 72, A-1210 Vienna, Austria
b Institute for Advanced Studies, Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria
c University of Applied Sciences Muenster, Department of Nursing, Leonardo Campus 8, D-48149 Muenster, Germany
Received 1 April 2005; accepted 1 February 2006
Available online 12 October 2006Abstract
We have developed an internet-based management game to illustrate the economic and organisational decision-making
process in a hospital by using discrete event simulation. Up to six hospitals compete against each other for inpatients with
diﬀerent disease categories and budget depending on hospital mission, regional health policy, inpatient reimbursement sys-
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sideration of diﬀerent inpatient reimbursement systems. The deployment of this game in teaching, policy and research
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Rauner).countries. On average, the EU-15 countries spent
8.6% or US-$ 2278 per capita and the USA spent
13.9% or US-$ 3248 per capita (adjusted, using pur-
chasing power parities) of its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) for health care in 2001 (Hofmarcher
et al., 2004). More than 40% of the health care costs
are consumed for hospitals in industrialised coun-
tries. Expensive or ‘‘big ticket’’ medical technologies
(BTTs) for the diagnosis and treatment of certain
clinical conditions (e.g., computer tomography
scanners – CTs, magnetic resonance imaging devices
– MRIs) were disclosed as contributing factors to.
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1995). As another example for a major driving force
of health care expenditures, policy makers identiﬁed
the ageing population in developed countries
(Fuchs, 1999). As a consequence, hospitals face a
situation of increasing costs as well as increasing
competition for decreasing budgets.
Hospital decision making has to account for the
interdependencies of the internal and external envi-
ronments to achieve predeﬁned strategic goals and
to survive on the market. Hospitals are complex sys-
tems consisting of the organisational culture within
the top layer; the general management subsystem
and the information subsystem within the middle
layer; and clinical, administrative support, ﬁnance,
physical facilities and marketing subsystem within
the bottom layer (Duncan et al., 1995). Hospitals
also interact with many stakeholders of the external
environment comprising general environmental
groups, regulators, vendors and suppliers, payers,
recipients and impactees as well as healthcare pro-
viders (Duncan et al., 1995).
Decisions in hospital management are highly
dependent on the inpatient reimbursement system
of the country. Due to limited budgets, many coun-
tries changed problematic public inpatient reim-
bursement systems that inﬂuenced hospitals to
extend the patients’ length of stay (day-based sys-
tem) or to increase services for patients (fee-for ser-
vice-based system) in order to maximise their
income to reimbursement systems that help contain
costs (Klauber et al., 2004; Leidl, 1998; Schwartz
et al., 1996). For example, reimbursement systems
that account for diagnosis and treatment of patients
(case-based systems) inﬂuence hospitals to discharge
patients earlier compared to day-based systems.
Such case-based systems were introduced in USA,
Germany and Austria in the last years. Global bud-
gets play a major role in shortening length of stay
and in decreasing the number of unnecessary ser-
vices in hospitals. Such global budget reimburse-
ment systems were implemented in a few countries
such as Canada (Leonard et al., 2003).
In addition to the reimbursement system, legal
conditions impact on policy making in hospitals.
For example, the Austrian Hospital Plan that regu-
lates specialisation and the Large Devices Plan that
regulates the purchase of BTTs for public hospitals
play a key role in Austria (Austrian Federal Insti-
tute for Public Health, 2000). Work hour regula-
tions for medical staﬀ highly inﬂuence human
resource management in hospitals.The budget of a hospital depends on the reim-
bursement system as well as on the number, kind
and average length of stay of patients treated. The
higher the budget, the more resources a hospital
can aﬀord. The planning and coordination of
resources such as personnel and equipment are
essential for process management which impact on
length of stay as well as on staﬀ and patient
satisfaction.
Chinese people used games as early as 3000 B.C.
Games have been a promising approach for
research, teaching and policy to investigate decision
making in a complex situation in various ﬁelds of
application such as military, education and business
for nearly 50 years (Faria, 1998; Keys, 1997; Knotts
and Keys, 1997; Summers, 2004; Washbush and
Gosen, 2001; Wolfe and Roge, 1997). Computer
games can be categorised as follows: adventure
games, arcade games, board games, card games,
puzzles, simulations, word games and miscellaneous
games (Dempsey et al., 2002). A simpliﬁed model of
reality is used for learning and the induced ﬁndings
or knowledge are translated back to reality (Garris
et al., 2002; Peters et al., 1998). For management
education, games are used in strategic manage-
ment/business policy, marketing, ﬁnance, manage-
ment, accounting and other business ﬁelds (Faria
and Wellington, 2004). In research, the game oﬀers
a stimulus to answer research questions, in teaching
the game can be seen as a medium to convey cogni-
tion and skills and in policy the game helps evaluate
policy options and solutions (Peters et al., 1998).
Management games use deep human inclination
to play games as a source for highly motivated
learning (Dempsey et al., 2002). Another major
advantage of management games is that players
act in an artiﬁcial simulated environment where
their decisions have no direct consequences on the
real world. Thus, it is possible for them to test diﬀer-
ent actions, increase their understanding of complex
interdependencies and to deﬁne optimal strategies.
The success of management games depends on
careful model building and evaluation of the valid-
ity of the games (Kriz, 2003; Peters et al., 1998; Tha-
vikulwat, 2004). A systematic design process, a
validity check by experts and future players as well
as an extensive testing are useful steps to improve
the validity of a game (Feinstein and Cannon,
2002; Peters et al., 1998). It is necessary to compress
time and concentrate on main eﬀects within the sim-
ulation model (Garris et al., 2002; Peters et al.,
1998). Otherwise the eﬀects of the game decisions
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However, the environment must be realistic for the
players as the game will not be accepted otherwise.
The internet technology highly impacted on sim-
ulation and gaming (Dasgupta, 2003; Kuljis and
Paul, 2003; Martin, 2003). Internet-based simula-
tion gaming allows convenient access to the game
from diﬀerent locations and simulation games thus
become more powerful (Pillutla, 2003). However,
the design of internet-based games requires a special
focus on issues such as time, access, facilitation and
communication (Asakawa and Gilbert, 2003).
The purpose of our internet-based management
game of up to six competing hospitals aims at sup-
porting the training of health policy makers, hospi-
tal staﬀ as well as students in departments of
business administration, economics, public manage-
ment, non-proﬁt management, hospital manage-
ment, nursing management and medicine in
hospital decision making. The simulation game
models the management, nursing, radiology and
surgery departments in a hospital. Players learn
about the interdependencies of resource, process
and ﬁnancial result management in four depart-
ments depending on the goals of the diﬀerent per-
sonnel groups: management staﬀ, nurses,
radiology assistants and physicians. Each player is
responsible for one department (management, nurs-
ing, radiology, surgery). The game trains decision
making within a team as decisions of one depart-
ment aﬀect the other three departments. This is
why decisions should be made in agreement with
the other three departments. For example, the clo-
sure of an operating theatre might increase patients’
length of stay in the hospital and thus the bed occu-
pancy rate and the workload in the nursing depart-
ment might rise. We account for diﬀerent patient
types admitted to the hospital treated by major spe-
cialities in the hospital (e.g., internal medicine, gyne-
cology, urology). Medical specialists indirectly play
a role in this hospital game as they require certain
resources (personnel, radiology machines and oper-
ating theatres) for their patients. The demand of
these patients has to be met by the department play-
ers of nursing, radiology and surgery and vice versa
the resources limit the patients who can be treated.
Furthermore, hospital games are useful for policy
purpose to illustrate how regulations impact on hos-
pital decision making and outcomes. Also for
research purpose, hospital management games can
be deployed to investigate diﬀerent game situations
by controlled experiments. The deployment of ourhospital game in teaching, policy and research
might inﬂuence policy making at a hospital level
(e.g., coordination), at a regional level (e.g., cooper-
ation) and a national level (e.g., choice of an ade-
quate inpatient reimbursement system) as well as
also induce further research in these ﬁelds.
The uniqueness of our hospital game consists of
the internet-based framework, the combination of
resource, process and ﬁnancial result management,
the competition of hospitals within a region and
the consideration of diﬀerent inpatient reimburse-
ment systems. We name this game COREmain hos-
pital: competition under diﬀerent reimbursement
systems – a management game via internet for hos-
pitals. The word ‘‘core’’ stands for the key parts of
a hospital to be represented in the hospital game.
‘‘Main hospital’’ symbolises a bigger hospital which
is in charge of treating patients with major diagno-
ses from a larger catchment area. Internet-based
simulation gaming allows convenient access to the
game from diﬀerent locations and helps simulation
games become a more powerful area (Kuljis and
Paul, 2003).
The paper provides a brief literature review on
health care management games in the next section.
Section 3 describes the design, methodology and
components of the simulation game and outlines
how the performance of the hospitals is evaluated.
In Section 4, we illustrate the potential usage of
COREmain hospital. We ﬁnally refer to issues for
further research in the conclusion.
2. Literature review on health care management
games
Simulation games are widely played in business
and education (Achtenhagen, 1992; Bronner and
Kollmannsperger, 1997; Fabel, 1993, 1998; Forseen
and Paivi, 2001; Graham et al., 1992; Keys, 1997;
Knotts and Keys, 1997; Summers, 2004; Washbush
and Gosen, 2001; Wolfe and Roge, 1997). They are
both used for training (Graf and Augustin, 1995;
Ho¨gsdal, 1995) and selection of employees (Bronner
et al., 1998; Sonnenberg, 1993).
In the last years, simulation games in health care
education evolved (Christensen et al., 2001; Green-
blatt, 2001; Lane et al., 2001; Satish et al., 2001;
Streufert et al., 2001). These games help players
learn essential skills regarding patients, processes
and environment interaction. Topics include dis-
eases management (e.g., inﬂammatory response,
prostate cancer), nursing, medical competency, run-
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agement. For example, simulation games for hospi-
tals focus on either the entire hospital or hospital’s
functions such as special departments or tasks.
The general management game ‘‘KLIMA’’ simu-
lates management decisions in an environment of a
reimbursement system based on payments per inpa-
tient per day (Meyer, 1988; Meyer and Hofweber,
1988). Due to the new German diagnosis and treat-
ment based reimbursement system, it was remod-
elled to a game named ‘‘KLIMAforte’’ to
investigate various management decisions within
the new reimbursement system. For example, the
decisions include production program planning,
methods of treatment, hospital hygiene, quality
management, investment planning as well as capac-
ity utilisation and manpower planning (Schwandt,
1998).
‘‘ASTERIKS’’, a discrete event simulation
model, deals with scheduling and personnel plan-
ning in a hospital without accounting for reimburse-
ment systems (Schwarz, 1992, 1993). The number of
decisions were numerous and could hardly be han-
dled within a training period of 2 days. ‘‘ASTE-
RIKSPRO’’ was developed based on ‘‘ASTERIKS’’
and allows to play diﬀerent departments separately
and thus reduced the number of decisions con-
siderably (Schwarz and Henning, 1996; Warnke,
2001). These two games were developed on a Pascal
platform and are not available for playing any
longer.
Another example of a hospital management
game is the ‘‘Canadian Hospital Executive Simula-
tion System’’ based on a mathematical model that
emphasis on key management decisions in each of
the functional areas of the hospital (Knotts et al.,
1990). The game ‘‘MOSHI’’ models the manage-
ment of small hospitals in a developing country,
Tansania (Fleßa, 1996, 1999).
Functional games include ‘‘ARKTIS’’ that
focuses on decision making in the pharmacy of a
hospital (Hofweber, 1987, 1989). The game ‘‘Staﬀ-
ing Persuits’’ was developed to assist in instructing
graduate nursing students with direct or indirect
staﬃng coordination (Nowak and Adams, 1988).
The ‘‘Anesthesia Crisis Resource Management
tool’’ (ACRM) uses a patient simulator to train
anesthesiologists interacting in crews and managing
crisis (Gaba et al., 2001).
While the hospital games discussed above focus
on teaching, policy and research, the commercial
software ‘‘Theme hospital’’ can be played by every-one and mainly serves as an entertainment tool
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theme_Hospital). It
provides an insight into hospital management from
the design of a hospital to operative management
decisions such as resource planning. The players
enjoy providing funny treatments to patients with
unusual diseases. Due to a variety of unrealistic fea-
tures, this game might not be suitable for training
and teaching purposes.
Our internet-based management game of com-
peting hospitals combines resource, process and
ﬁnancial result management in a setting of change-
able reimbursement systems. Thus, the conse-
quences of diﬀerent reimbursement systems for
decision making can be illustrated to players of dif-
ferent countries. The players learn about the neces-
sity of good personnel planning and scheduling in
order to reach short length of stays for patients trea-
ted with as few resources and as high revenues as
possible. Our hospital game also serves the policy
purpose by illustrating how regulations impact on
hospital decision making and outcomes. Compared
to the other hospital games, the features above
together with its internet platform make the game
unique and suitable for being applied in various
countries with diﬀerent reimbursement systems.
3. The game
3.1. General design
Before the game starts, a game host (in case of a
guided class room game) or a user manual (in case
of a purely internet-based game) explains the inter-
net-based management game by describing the
starting situation, possible decisions and important
interdependencies within the system (see Fig. 1).
The game host deﬁnes the health policy of the
region which aﬀects the decision making of the play-
ers. He/she decides among others for example about
the percentage of emergency patients for each hospi-
tal, the patient categories to be treated and the reim-
bursement system.
The game simulates a region with up to six hos-
pitals treating inpatients with diﬀerent disease cate-
gories for 12 monthly periods of 28 days. We use a
warm-up period to ﬁll the empty hospital beds so
that players can run an existing hospital. The inter-
net software oﬀers a communication infrastructure
to enable players to exchange information and to
make corporate decisions within the hospital and
with other hospitals.
Definition of
regional health policy
Definition of
hospital mission
Period
decisions
Simulation
Period results
12 monthly periods  
of 28 days
Final results
Introduction
to the game
Fig. 1. The framework of COREmain hospital.
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pital at the beginning and after six periods and aims
at performing well in each period by sound periodRe
gio
na
l h
eal
th 
po
lic
y
Management
Nursing
Radiology Surgery
Managem
Nursin
Radiology
Labour market & radiolo
Fig. 2. General decision-making strudecision making resulting in good period results.
The game host determines how transparent the
health policy targets of the region are to the compet-
ing hospitals. The performance of each hospital is
evaluated on pre-selected indicators such as number
of patients, quality of medical care, patient satisfac-
tion and staﬀ satisfaction. The winner of the game is
the hospital that performed best both in fulﬁlling
their own hospital mission and regional health pol-
icy targets over the 12 monthly periods.
The hospitals compete against each other for
inpatients with diﬀerent disease categories and bud-
get depending on hospital mission, regional health
policy, inpatient reimbursement system (day-, case-
or global-budget based) as well as labour market sit-
uation for medical staﬀ and radiology technologies
available. Each hospital has up to 500 beds for
which we considered four departments to model
the internal structure of the hospital: management,
nursing, radiology and surgery (see Fig. 2). The
uniqueness of our hospital game in the literature
consists of the internet-based framework, the com-
petition of hospitals within a region and the consid-
eration of diﬀerent inpatient reimbursement
systems.
The regional health policy and performance of
the hospital in previous periods inﬂuence on the
allocation of patients to hospitals in a certain per-
iod. Depending on the labour market situationReimbursement system
ent
g
Surgery
Management
Nursing
Radiology Surgery
gy technology market
cture of COREmain hospital.
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quickly or slowly and staﬀ can be ﬁred immediately
or after a certain waiting period. The radiology
technology market oﬀers several types of radiology
machines that, for example, diﬀer in purchase costs,
variable running costs, examinations to be under-
taken and medical quality of examinations.
Players can make alternative decisions for capac-
ity planning as well as patient scheduling and
control problems depending on diﬀerent reimbur-
sement systems. We considered four types of
inpatient reimbursement systems based on: (1) inpa-
tient days independent of diagnosis and treatment,
(2) Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs) with unlim-
ited budget, (3) DRGs with limited budget and (4)
global budgets. Currently, case-based payment
systems such as DRG systems (e.g., in the USA,
Germany and Austria) and global budgets (e.g., in
Canada) constitute the predominant payment strat-
egies for inpatients (Leidl, 1998; Schwartz et al.,
1996). The day-based payment structure indepen-
dent of diagnosis and treatment of the inpatients
is seldom used nowadays. Such systems – like the
pre-1997 Austrian one – caused a lot of problems
as hospitals tended to discharge patients quite late
resulting in a prolonged length of stay in hospitals
(Rauner and Schaﬀhauser-Linzatti, 1999, 2001,
2002; Rauner et al., 2003, 2006). The longer patients
stay in hospitals, the more resources are neededResource management
• Personnel (nursing, radiology, surgery)
• Machines (radiology)
• Operating theatres (surgery)
Financial result
• Discharge plannin
Quality
treatment
Length of stay
Cost
Revenu
Financial 
General conditions:
• Regional health policy
• Reimbursement system
• Labour market
• Radiology technology market 
Fig. 3. Resource, process and ﬁnancial resul(e.g., staﬀ, beds) and the more costly patients
become.
DRG-like reimbursement systems force hospitals
to discharge inpatients earlier compared to day-
based ones, whereupon global budgets have an even
higher eﬀect as the given budget covers all expenses
of hospitals and is independent of the inpatient cat-
egories treated. DRG-like systems also cause prob-
lems for health care systems such as decline of
health care quality, ‘‘cream-skimming’’ of lucrative
patient categories and ‘‘DRG-creep’’, the classiﬁca-
tion of cases to better reimbursed DRG-categories
(Feldstein, 1993; Fetter, 1991; Zakoworotny,
1993). Using global budgeting, decision makers
have to ensure that the quality of care does not
decrease due to cost cuts as a result of regulations
(Feldstein, 1993; Neubauer and Demmler, 1991).
Leonard et al. (2003) demonstrated for several main
clinical categories that with the Austrian DRG-like
reimbursement system inpatients stayed longer than
in Canada where hospitals operate under global
budgets.
Within each hospital, players make decisions on
resource, process and ﬁnancial result management
as displayed in Fig. 3. We aimed at considering
main components of the decision-making process
in management, nursing, radiology and surgery with
simultaneously keeping manageable the number of
decisions to be undertaken by the players.Process management
• Admission planning (nursing)
• Patient scheduling (radiology)
• Patient scheduling (surgery)
 management
g (nursing)
 of
/care
Number/Category
of patients
s
es
result
Variable conditions:
• Policy of other hospitals
t management of COREmain hospital.
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(nursing, radiology, surgery), machines (radiology)
as well as operating theatres (surgery). They are also
responsible for process management consisting of
admission planning and patient scheduling in radi-
ology and surgery. The ﬁnancial result management
determines the discharge policy of patients. All
management decisions are inﬂuenced by general
and variable conditions by mutually inﬂuencing
each other. For example, the more resources are
available, the more patients can be admitted and
the shorter the waiting times for radiology and sur-
gery. The better the process management, the earlier
patients can be discharged.
Depending on the resource, process and ﬁnancial
result management, a certain number of patients per
category is treated in the hospital with a certain
quality for a certain period of time. The higher the
number of patients competing for limited resources
in a hospital is, the longer the length of stay of
patients. Furthermore, a medically too short stay
of patients in a hospital might negatively inﬂuence
the quality of care. A decreased quality of care
might attract less patients in the subsequent period
depending on the quality of care provided by the
other competing hospitals in the region.
The number of patients per category, the length
of stay of the patients and the quality of care and
treatment as well as the reimbursement system
determine the ﬁnancial result of a hospital, the costs
minus the revenues. High total costs might be
incurred by a large number of not-cost covering
patients treated, a high number of personnel, a large
number of high-tech radiology machines, the open-
ing of many operating theatres, a poor process man-
agement, a long average length of stay of patients as
well as high variable and ﬁxed accounting costs.
Total revenues depend on the reimbursement sys-
tem, on the policy of the other hospitals as well as
on the number and category of patients treated.
3.2. Software technology and methodology
We deﬁned key requirements for the software
technology: (1) the game should be internet-based,
(2) the simulation data should be stored in a data-
base, (3) the development software should not be
too expensive, (4) the development software tech-
nology should be ‘‘state of the art’’ and (5) a thin cli-
ent concept should be implemented (Steinbauer,
2005). Based on these requirements, our PhD stu-
dent Joerg Gesslbauer of the University of AppliedSciences Wiener Neustadt, Austria, has chosen the
object-oriented programming language C# and the
ASP.NET 2.0 (Active Server Page.NET) Web Pro-
gramming Framework based on the .NET Frame-
work to realise a distributed and server-centric
web application with four tiers (Stahlknecht and
Hasenkamp, 2005): (1) client, (2) web-server, (3)
application server and (4) database server.
The client is represented by a web-browser, which
runs on the player’s computer and displays dynamic
HTML pages (Lubkowitz, 2005) built on the
ASP.NET 2.0 technology. It performs the task of
the user interface of the game. An ASP.NET 2.0-
compatible web-server like the Microsoft Internet
Information Services (IIS) fulﬁls the functions of
both the second and third tier: The web-server
receives a request from any web-browser and runs
an ASP.NET 2.0 program (the business logic)
directly on the server. Afterwards, it sends back
the output (in terms of HTML) to the client. The
client can view the HTML page by the web-browser.
For the development process, we use the Microsoft
Visual Studio 2005 Standard Edition, which inte-
grates a complete set of development tools for build-
ing ASP.NET Web applications among other
features. The fourth tier, the database server, stores
the data for the game. We have chosen the Micro-
soft SQL Server Express database server because it
is a very reliable and up-to-date database system
and is furthermore absolutely free for use.
The game is based on a discrete-event simulation.
Patients are individually generated and wait for
admission to a certain hospital. A patient can either
be admitted or refused by a hospital. After being
admitted, each patient is individually tracked
through the hospital undergoing nursing, radiology
and surgery. Finally, the patients are discharged. To
account for these diﬀerent states, a state chart
machine is used and the information is stored in
databases.
We are currently in the ﬁnal stage of develop-
ment of COREmain hospital game. The business
logic with all main formulas is derived based on
our past experience with hospital games as well as
research in the ﬁeld of hospital management and
cooperation with hospitals on diﬀerent practical
projects. We are gathering data from hospitals
(management, nursing, radiology, surgery), collect-
ing data from companies that sell radiology
machines and obtaining data from health ministries
on inpatient reimbursement systems. We use this
data gathering process for detailed evaluation of
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reﬁnement of the business logic by next months.
The main data required for the business logic are
entered by the developer (see Fig. 4). The game host
deﬁnes the game condition.
The implementation of COREmain hospital
should be ﬁnished by summer 2007. The data entry
part for the player interface as well as the database
including the state chart machine are implemented.
An exemplary interface for the data entry by the
nursing player is given in the next session. We are
currently programming the business logic and the
simulation (hospital model on the server) as well
as the communication platform and the evaluation
part including period and ﬁnal results (player inter-
face). The internet-based technology centrally
administers all data, period and ﬁnal results, as well
as the communication messages written among the
players. Thus, all information and results from
one game can easily be analysed compared to other
games. This is especially useful for the experimental
investigation of COREmain hospital which is a
topic for further research.
The communication platform plays a key role in
the interaction process among the players. Here the
diﬀerent players of a hospital (management, nursing,
radiology, surgery) exchange information for coor-
dinating strategies within a hospital. If the game is
played centralised in one room (e.g., PC laboratory),
then this communication platform will become less
important compared to a decentralised game situa-
tion (e.g., diﬀerent PC laboratories, PCs at work or
home) in which the players can not communicate
face to face. The decentralised game situation
requires the internet-based approach and enables
to overcome local and temporal restrictions. It isPlayer
Data entry: period decision making
SimulationDatabaseBusiness logic
Evaluation: period and final results
Communication platform
Game host
Game condition
Developer
Game data
Interface (client)
Hospital model (server)
Fig. 4. The structure of COREmain hospital software.planned that diﬀerent groups (students, researchers,
policy makers) from diﬀerent countries (e.g., Euro-
pean countries, US, Canada) play the game together.
Furthermore, the management player of a hospital
can exchange information for example on market
data or on the hospital’s evaluation process and
might establish strategic alliances with other hospi-
tals. Especially for inter-hospital communication,
the internet-based approach is beneﬁcial for centra-
lised games as this prevents the uncontrolled face-
to-face communication among players from diﬀerent
hospitals and also complicates spying.
The evaluation interface is essential for the hospi-
tal players to improve decision making for the next
period in order to gain and sustain their competitive
edge. This is why we are constantly improving the
interfaces of our hospital game using feedback from
testing games with students, researchers and policy
makers. We will also further improve our business
logic as well as interface based on that testing expe-
rience keeping in mind that the degree of detail is
suﬃcient and that the game does not become too
complex. This main reﬁnement process of CORE-
main hospital might continue until summer 2007.
3.3. Period decision making
The key aspect of this game comprises the illus-
tration of management staﬀs’, nurses’, radiology
assistants’ and surgery teams’ decision making on
the hospital’s performance by focusing on four main
departments: (1) management, (2) nursing, (3)
radiology and (4) surgery. The game participants
are responsible for one or more of these four
departments.
The decisions of the players depend on the gen-
eral and variable conditions of the game as well as
on the patient-category-mix and the percentage of
emergency patients. The game host can consider
up to 15 operative (e.g., total hip replacement, cae-
sarean section, hysterectomy, prostatectomy) and
non-operative (e.g., acute myocardial infarction,
stroke, asthma) patient categories covering a wide
range of speciality areas in a hospital (e.g., internal
medicine, gynecology, urology). We have gathered
data on treatment paths for the main Austrian oper-
ative and non-operative cases. The treatment paths
are not hard-coded and can be deﬁned in a game
editor interface. A treatment path for a patient cat-
egory contains the radiology examinations desired
and their duration as well as for operative-cases also
the kind of surgery needed and its duration. Fur-
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ical-induced waiting times for radiology examina-
tions and surgeries. The nursing category varies
within the diﬀerent states of the treatment path.
Potential length of stay boundaries as well as the
amount of reimbursement per patient category can
be determined by the game host in the game editor.
Patients of category i(i = 1, . . . ,15) are assigned
to hospital j in each decision period t(pi,j,t). In the
region, there are n hospitals. Eq. (1) illustrates this
allocation process accounting for both a ﬁxed allo-
cation part determined by the game host (ﬁrst term)
and a variable allocation part depending on the per-
formance of the hospitals in the past three periods
(second term):
pi;j;t ¼ aP i þ
P3
k¼1
P3
u¼1xkquMj;k;tuPn
j¼1
P3
k¼1
P3
u¼1xkquMj;k;tu
 !
 ð1 naÞ  P i
8i¼ 1; . . . ;15; j¼ 1; . . . ;n; t ¼ 1; . . . ;12: ð1Þ
The game host deﬁnes a ﬁxed percentage of
patients allocated to a hospital (a) and the total
number of category i patients to be treated in the
region during the simulation game (Pi), whereby
a Æ n< = 1. If a Æ n = 1, then only a ﬁxed percentage
of patients is allocated among the hospitals, while
a Æ n = 0 means that the allocation of patients is only
dependent on the performance of hospital j in previ-
ous periods (qu is the weight for three previous peri-
ods, where the sum over these weights equals one).
The better the performance of hospital j in the three
previous periods t  u, the more patients can be
attracted in period t. We account for three perfor-
mance measures k for each hospital j in period
t  u (Mj,k,tu): (1) quality of medical care, (2)
patient satisfaction and (3) staﬀ satisfaction. These
performance measures are aggregates of outcome
measures. For example, quality of medical care is
a function of (1) average length of stay of patients,
(2) dismissal rate of emergency patients, (3) motiva-
tion of staﬀ, (4) workload of nurses, (5) workload of
surgery teams, (6) overtime of radiology assistants
and surgery teams and (7) medical quality of
machines in radiology. The game host determines
the weighting of these three performance measures
(xk).3.3.1. Management
At the beginning and after six periods, the player
of the management component decides on the mis-
sion of the hospital by weighting the mission crite-ria. The following mission criteria can be selected:
(1) high quality of medical care, (2) high patient sat-
isfaction, (3) high staﬀ satisfaction, (4) high occu-
pancy rate, (5) short length of stay, (6) high
number of patients discharged, (7) high regional
market share, (8) high/low severity index, (9) low
dismissal rate, (10) high surplus and (11) low costs.
In case of a DRG-based reimbursement system, we
have three more mission criteria: (12) high number
of DRG-points, (13) not-discovered DRG-creep
and (14) high value per DRG-point. At the end of
each game period, it is checked whether or not a
hospital has fulﬁlled its own mission. The hospital
that both fulﬁlled its own mission and the regional
mission best, is the winner of the game period.
Thereby it is important that the management com-
municates the general mission strategy to the other
three departments in order that nursing, radiology
and surgery base their resource, process and ﬁnan-
cial result management decisions on that hospital
mission.
To account for problems with DRG-systems, we
modelled DRG-creep in this game. In DRG-based
reimbursement systems, hospitals might intention-
ally misqualify patients to better reimbursed catego-
ries to increase their revenues (Feldstein, 1993;
Fetter, 1991; Zakoworotny, 1993). However, such
a behaviour is often investigated by regulatory
agencies or government institutions. For example,
several Austrian hospitals even used an optimisa-
tion software to increase DRG-like points by shift-
ing patients to other categories. This was the reason
why the government introduced an anti-optimiser
software to trace so-called ‘‘black sheep’’ hospitals.
Such hospitals had to pay a penalty for their behav-
iour (Rauner and Schaﬀhauser-Linzatti, 1999, 2001,
2002).
The management player determines the percent-
age of DRG-creep in each period keeping in mind
that if the misqualiﬁcation rate is too high, this rude
behaviour might be disclosed by the regulatory
agency and then the hospital will have to pay a pen-
alty. In case the misqualiﬁcation rate is below a
boundary deﬁned by the game host, the manage-
ment might be successful in increasing their DRG-
points. Increased DRG-points lead to an increased
revenue in a DRG-system with unlimited budget.
In a DRG-system with limited budget, it depends
on the DRG-points gathered by the other hospitals
whether or not increased DRG-points raise the rev-
enue (Rauner and Schaﬀhauser-Linzatti, 1999,
2001, 2002; Rauner et al., 2003).
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iour of other hospitals, the management player can
purchasemarket data of other hospitals from a regio-
nal authority or he/she can exchange data for free via
the communication platformwithmanagement play-
ers of other hospitals by undergoing a data-sharing
coalition. Furthermore, the management player can
make investments to increase staﬀ satisfaction which
has an impact of the quality of care as well as conse-
quently on the number of patients attracted by the
hospital in subsequent periods.
3.3.2. Nursing
The nursing player schedules admissions of
patients using scheduling rules and plans discharges
depending on the hospital management’s objectives
as well as on the general and variable conditions of
the region. Furthermore, the resource, process and
ﬁnancial result management also impact on admis-
sion and discharge strategies. The nursing player
can prioritise patient categories and reject operative
patients if the surgery waiting lists are getting too
long. A ﬁxed number of non-emergency patients
or a number of non-emergency patients up to a cer-
tain percentage of the non-emergency capacity can
be admitted. Fig. 5 illustrates key factors inﬂuencing
the length of stay of patients. Waiting times due to
limited capacities and organisational deﬁciencies as
well as boundaries for the minimum medical and
medical recommended length of stay result in the
organisationally possible length of stay. Due toOrganisationally poss
length of stay
Real le
Waiting times due to
limited capacities
Waiting times due to
organisational deficiencies
Minimum medical
length of stay
Improved health care
Finan
Fig. 5. Factors inﬂuencing thethe reimbursement system or other economic rea-
soning, the organisationally possible length of stay
might be increased up to an economically desired
length of stay. This real length of stay impacts on
the ﬁnancial result depending on the reimbursement
system. Each day in a hospital is costly as variable
nursing and material costs arise.
As DRG-based reimbursement systems are
mainly independent of inpatients’ length of stays
and only provide low compensations for extended
length of stays and global budgeting even neglect
length of stays, the nursing player will discharge
patients earlier in these two systems compared to
inpatient day-based reimbursement systems. In the
later systems, the longer patients stay, the higher is
the reimbursement. Such systems tend to discharge
patients with expensive treatments late compared
to patients with cheap treatments because cheaper
patients’ costs can be covered with a shorter length
of stay (Rauner and Schaﬀhauser-Linzatti, 1999,
2001, 2002; Schwartz et al., 1996). For example,
Rauner et al. (2006) found that patients with knee
joint damages stayed 5.93 days under an inpatient
day-based reimbursement system in Austrian hospi-
tals in 1996. After the introduction of a DRG-like
system in Austria in 1997, this length of stay dramat-
ically decreased from 5.47 days in 1997 to even less
than 4.5 days in 2002 (Rauner et al., 2006).
The nursing player also decides about human
resource planning such as hiring and ﬁring full-time
and part-time nurses as well as determining nurses’Economically desired
length of stay
ible
Medical length of stay
recommended
ngth of stay
 supply
Extension based on
economic reasoning
cial result
Reimbursement system
length of stay of patients.
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planning. Fig. 6 illustrates the user interface for
the nursing player with respect to human resource
planning. In case of a high workload of nurses,
the staﬀ and patient satisfaction decrease resulting
in a negative impact on the number of patients
attracted by the hospital in the subsequent periods.
3.3.3. Radiology
The radiology department plays a crucial role in
a hospital as treatment and care strategies as well as
surgery of a patient depend on his/her radiology’s
statement. The decision making of this player is
depended on the general and variable conditions
of the region, the hospital’s mission and the deci-
sions made in management, nursing and surgery.
The radiology player deﬁnes the opening hours
of the radiology department. Outside the opening
hours, one radiology assistant is on duty to examine
emergency patients. The player also selects schedul-
ing rules for patients waiting for a radiology exam-Fig. 6. The human resource planning interface ofination. For example, the player determines the type
of queuing strategies: (1) one queue for each
machine or (2) one queue for each type of radiology
examination. Next, the player chooses the priority
for radiology examinations such as ﬁrst arrived
patient ﬁrst (ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out), patients with short-
est/longest examination ﬁrst and patients with pre-
viously postponed examinations ﬁrst.
To cope with the radiology’s department work-
load, the player can purchase and close radiology
units. The radiology department of a hospital can
have up to 20 picture diagnostic sites with diﬀerent
machines out of a range of 10 diﬀerent machine
types (e.g., CT, MRI). The developer deﬁnes which
machines are available for purchase and which
examinations of which quality can be undergone
by each machine type.
The radiology player is also involved in the
human resource planning process by hiring and ﬁr-
ing full-time and part-time radiology assistants as
well as determining radiology assistants’ overtime.COREmain hospital for the nursing player.
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Similar to radiology, the surgery department
with its operating theatres is another main compo-
nent of a hospital. The surgery department is highly
dependent on the radiology department because for
most operative patients a radiology examination is
done before the surgery. Operative patients can only
be discharged after having undergone a surgery
which again impacts on the discharging policy of
the nursing department.
The surgery player decides on opening hours of
the operating theatres. Outside the opening hours,
one surgery team is on duty but only in case of
emergency. The surgery player can also reserve an
operating room for emergency patients only. To
deal with the demand for surgeries, the surgery
player can open and close operating theatres. Up
to 12 operating rooms can be opened. In case of
reimbursement systems that promote a short length
of stay of patients such as DRG-based and global
budget systems, a higher incentive for opening addi-
tional operating rooms will be induced.
The surgery player also chooses scheduling rules
for operative patients. For example, he/she can pri-
oritise patients with previously postponed surgeries,
patients with long/short surgery times and patients
who were booked ﬁrst for the surgery. Emergency
patients always have highest priority for surgery.
Furthermore, the player can hire and ﬁre full-
time and part-time surgery teams and determine
surgery teams’ overtime.
3.4. Period and ﬁnal results
At the end of each period the performance of
hospitals is evaluated. We have selected the follow-
ing performance measures: (1) quality of medical
care, (2) patient satisfaction, (3) staﬀ satisfaction,
(4) occupancy rate, (5) length of stay, (6) number
of patients discharged, (7) regional market share,
(8) severity index, (9) dismissal rate, (10) surplus,
(11) costs and – in case of a DRG-based reimburse-
ment system – (12) number of DRG-points, (13)
not-discovered DRG-creep and (14) value per
DRG-point. Each of the performance measures is
an aggregate of a number of outcome measures as
described for quality of medical care at the begin-
ning of Section 3.3.
Depending on the decisions of the players and
the mission of their hospital, each hospital obtains
diﬀerent performance measures. A non-proﬁt pri-
vate hospital might aim at a high quality of medicalcare and a low dismissal rate of patients keeping in
mind costs, while a for-proﬁt hospital wants to gain
a surplus by specialising in proﬁtable patients
regardless of dismissing less proﬁtable patients.
Here, the players learn how the management is
inﬂuenced by hospital types (e.g., for-proﬁt hospi-
tal, non-proﬁt private hospital, public hospital), dif-
ferent reimbursement systems and the actions taken
by other hospitals in the region.
We calculate main nursing, radiology, surgery
and additional costs. Nursing costs comprise full-
time, part-time and overtime staﬀ costs as well as
variable material costs per day depending on the
nursing category for patients treated. We acknowl-
edge that the nursing category of patients varies
during the stay in the hospital. The radiology costs
cover full-time, part-time and overtime staﬀ costs,
variable and ﬁxed material costs as well as deduc-
tion costs for picture diagnostic machines. The sur-
gery costs include full-time, part-time and overtime
staﬀ costs, variable and ﬁxed material costs as well
as deduction costs for operating theatres. Addi-
tional costs are costs for extra, not-modelled staﬀ,
motivation costs for staﬀ, costs for purchasing mar-
ket data of other hospitals from a regional authority
and penalty costs for discovered DRG-creep.
The revenue of a hospital depends on the reim-
bursement system. In a day-based system, the num-
ber of inpatients treated and the payment per
inpatient day is of importance. Depending on the
performance of a hospital in relation to the other
hospitals of the region in period t, each hospital
obtains a budget share of the total budget of the
region in a global budget reimbursement system.
The game host determines the weights for perfor-
mance measures used for global budget allo-
cation.
In a DRG-based system, the number of and pay-
ment for patients per category depending on the
patients’ length of stay and DRG-creep activities
inﬂuence the hospital’s income. If a limited-budget
DRG-reimbursement system is played, then a hospi-
tal’s income will be dependent on the number of
patients per category, the payment for each patient
category depending on the patients’ length of stay
and DRG-creep activities of the other hospitals.
Eqs. (2) and (3) exemplarily illustrate the bud-
get allocation formula for a limited-budget DRG-
reimbursement system. As mentioned above, all
hospitals report data on the number and length of
stay of patients treated in each category. Using that
information, DRG-points are calculated for each
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creep. This calculation process is slightly diﬀerent
in several countries and we accounted for the Ger-
man and Austrian systems as these two systems
are good representatives of the DRG-systems
worldwide (Federal Ministry of Health and
Women, 2005; Klauber et al., 2004; Leidl, 1998;
Schwartz et al., 1996). The variable DRGj,t denotes
the total DRG-points gathered by hospital j in per-
iod t and the parameter Bt the total budget of the
region in period t. Then, the value per DRG-point
vt can be determined in period t (see Eq. (2)):
vt ¼ BtPn
j¼1DRGj;t
8t ¼ 1; . . . ; 12: ð2Þ
After calculating the DRG-point value, the bud-
get (bj,t) can be allocated to hospital j in period t
according to Eq. (3):
bj;t ¼ vtDRGj;t 8j ¼ 1; . . . ; n; t ¼ 1; . . . ; 12: ð3Þ
In such a system, a hospital with fair behaviour
might obtain a low budget share even when report-
ing a high number of DRG-points (non-DRG-
creep) because other hospitals have cheated. On
the other hand, the more obvious the cheating is,
the higher the chance that a hospital is punished
and has to pay a penalty.
The period ﬁnancial result of a hospital is given
by the diﬀerence between the revenues and the costs
in a certain period. The winner of the game is the
hospital that performed best both in fulﬁlling their
own mission targets and health policy targets of
the region over the 12 monthly periods.
4. Potential usage of CORE main hospital
As discussed before, management games play a
key role in teaching, policy and research. CORE-
main hospital is planned to be deployed in all these
three ﬁelds.
In a ﬁrst step, COREmain hospital will be used
for teaching students and practitioners resource,
process and ﬁnancial management by considering
diﬀerent general environmental conditions (e.g.,
regional health policy, reimbursement system,
labour market, radiology technology market). They
will also learn how to coordinate strategies within a
hospital among diﬀerent personnel groups: manage-
ment staﬀ, nurses, physicians and radiology
assistants. In addition, they can experience how
cooperation strategies among hospitals can be ben-
eﬁcial for a hospital region.The next step will be the application of CORE-
main hospital to investigate key concepts of hospital
policy and management. We plan to incorporate
key Austrian decision makers in health policy. For
example, the Vienna hospital compound could ana-
lyse how coordinated specialisation strategies
regarding treatment of certain patient groups, pur-
chase and usage of radiology machines as well as
opening/closure of operating theatres will increase
the overall regional hospital eﬃcacy by lowering
overall regional hospital costs. Decision makers in
the Austrian Ministry of Health and Women could
experience the obstacles as well as economical, eth-
ical and political consequences of inpatient reim-
bursement systems. This might help improving the
existing Austrian reimbursement system.
Based on our experience gained in application
steps one and two, we will improve COREmain hos-
pital to make it most suitable for teaching and pol-
icy. Here we have to balance the degree of detail
with the complexity of the game. In a ﬁnal step,
we plan to utilise COREmain hospital for research
purpose. Experimental economics has gained
importance since the early 1930ies and has been
applied to many economic problems such as public
goods, coordination problems, auctions, bargain-
ing, industrial organisation, asset markets and indi-
vidual decision making (Kagel and Roth, 1995).
Past hospital management games were not investi-
gated in detail by experimental economics. Thus,
we will experimentally analyse diﬀerent game situa-
tions with both teaching and policy purpose. We
could compare diﬀerences between pure internet-
based games and workshop games where players
personally meet and interact. Moreover, we might
study diﬀerent player groups (e.g., students,
researchers and practitioners with medical, manage-
ment or regulatory background) or mixed player
groups with diﬀerent knowledge levels about run-
ning a hospital and reimbursement systems. Fur-
thermore, we can experimentally evaluate the
impact of diﬀerent reimbursement strategies from
a single hospital and overall hospital region
perspective.
5. Conclusion and further research
The changing situation in hospital markets
requires well-trained personnel for management in
hospital. Health care policy makers such as minis-
tries of health also have to understand and estimate
the impact of regulations on hospital management
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attention needs to be paid to personnel planning
(Docteur, 2003) and purchase of expensive equip-
ment such as BTTs (Lazaro and Fitch, 1995)
because they incur most of the costs in hospitals.
Due to numerous interdependencies among internal
hospitals’ decisions and the external environments
of hospitals, decision making in a hospitals is of
high complexity. Hospital managers choose diﬀer-
ent strategies depending on the reimbursement sys-
tem, labour and radiology technology market,
regional and national health policy as well as legal
conditions. The changes of reimbursement and legal
systems in many countries during the last decades
provoked an extensive need for advanced training
of decision makers in the hospital sector.
Trial and error decisions in hospitals would not
only cause enormous costs and endanger the exis-
tence of the hospital and in consequence might even
put patients’ lives at risk. For this reason, manage-
ment games can play an important role in this ﬁeld
to train and support decision makers. When setting
up a hospital game, a modeller has to focus on the
main decision making eﬀects and compression of
time to achieve good training results and desired
quality of the decision support. Hospital games help
students and hospital staﬀ understand decision
making in complex situations. Furthermore, hospi-
tal games illustrate to health care policy makers
how regulations impact on hospital decision making
and outcomes. Also for research purpose, hospital
management games can be used to investigate diﬀer-
ent game situations by controlled experiments. The
deployment of our hospital game in teaching, policy
and research might inﬂuence policy making both at
a hospital level (e.g., coordination), at a regional
level (e.g., cooperation) and a national level (e.g.,
choice of adequate inpatient reimbursement sys-
tems) and also induce further research in these
ﬁelds.
The management game presented in this paper is
a promising tool for training decision making in
hospitals. The uniqueness of our hospital game con-
sists of the internet-based framework of competing
hospitals, the combination of resource, process
and ﬁnancial result management in a set-up of
changeable reimbursement systems and environ-
mental conditions. The players learn about the inde-
pendencies among and the varying goals in key
departments: management, nursing, radiology and
surgery. We compressed the time to 12 gaming peri-
ods of 1 month each. We will start to evaluate thissystem with students, researchers and policy makers
the next months by investigating diﬀerent game sit-
uations in detail. Based on this experience, we will
adapt the game regarding main issues if necessary.
Here we have to balance the degree of detail with
the complexity of the game.
For further research, a laboratory or a transport
system within a hospital might be modelled to illus-
trate further decision making in these ﬁelds. For
example, bottlenecks due to the transport system
could be investigated. The impact of diﬀerent tech-
nologies on service time and costs could be studied
in laboratory decision making. Another extension
of the game might be the inclusion of ambulatory
care. Currently, we account for a general nursing
department but one could also consider speciﬁc
nursing departments for major specialities (e.g.,
internal medicine, gynecology, urology). However,
such extensions might complicate the system in such
a way that the game might become too complex.
Currently, the reports provided to the hospital
player list for example occupancy rates of nursing
beds, radiology units and operating theatres. One
might consider providing a graphical interface
which illustrates the ﬂow of single patients through
the hospital (from admission to discharge) during a
simulation period.
Another interesting ﬁeld of research could be the
comparison of learning behaviour, game results and
overall success of pure internet games where the
players never meet each other personally with a
gaming set-up of a two-day workshop where players
personally meet and interact. Moreover, the out-
come of our game could be studied when applied
to diﬀerent player groups (e.g., students, researchers
and practitioners with medical, management or reg-
ulatory background) or to mixed player groups with
diﬀerent knowledge levels about running a hospital
and reimbursement systems.
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This paper provides the ﬁrst taxonomy of hospital efﬁciency studies that uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) and
related techniques. We provide a systematic review of 79 such studies published from 1984–2004 that represent 12
countries. Only studies written in English are considered. A cross-national comparison reveals signiﬁcant differences with
respect to important study characteristics such as type of DEA model selected and choice of input and output categories.
Compared with US studies, European efforts are more likely to measure allocative rather than technical efﬁciency, use
longitudinal data, and use fewer observations. We take a longitudinal perspective that illustrates the life cycle of this
research, as well as its diffusion across disciplines. Our taxonomy can be used by policy makers and researchers to review
past, and assemble new, DEA models.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Data envelopment analysis; Stochastic frontier analysis; Hospital efﬁciency; Taxonomy1. Introduction
In Europe and elsewhere, public pressure and executive interest for cost containment have led to numerous
studies of the organizational causes of excess resource utilization, leading national governments to seek new
approaches to solve these important problems. Efﬁciency measurement represents a ﬁrst step towards the
evaluation of a coordinated health care system, and constitutes one of the basic means of audit for the rational
distribution of human and economic resources.
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) has proven to be an effective and versatile tool for health care efﬁciency
measurement, and its use has spread throughout the world. This paper provides a systematic review and
taxonomy of hospital efﬁciency studies that utilize DEA and related techniques for efﬁciency measurement.
DEA was ﬁrst used to measure the technical efﬁciency of US hospitals more than 20 years ago. In our
taxonomy, we review 79 hospital efﬁciency studies representing 12 countries and four continents [1–79]. Wee front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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L. O’Neill et al. / Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 42 (2008) 158–189 159included all studies published in refereed journals or books that were either published or available in pre-print
during the period 1984–2004.
In order to keep our survey project within resource constraints, technical reports and proceedings were
excluded, as were papers published in a language other than English. The essential features of each study were
summarized; these included: choice of input and output categories; type of efﬁciency measured (technical vs.
allocative); time frame considered (single year vs. multiple years); and the type of DEA model chosen.
A longitudinal perspective illustrated the life cycle of this research through the stages of early adoption, rapid
growth, and maturity.
Some recent studies have reviewed the relevant literature with respect to DEA in general [80], and non-
parametric and parametric efﬁciency studies within health care in particular [81,82]. Our paper extends this
previous work in several important ways. First, we examine cross-national differences in various study
characteristics, as well as how the local environment inﬂuences both the input and output category selection
and the speciﬁc methodology chosen.
Second, we provide a taxonomy of hospital efﬁciency studies based on the type of efﬁciency measured and
the input and output categories selected. Third, we trace the life cycle of this research and its diffusion across
countries and related disciplines. And, ﬁnally, we identify how model speciﬁcation has changed over time in
response to changes in hospital ﬁnancing.
We hypothesize that the external environment frames many aspects of model development in DEA: from
the questions asked, to the data available, to the input and output categories selected. We focus on hospitals in
order to highlight potential differences across countries, and to explain these differences in terms of
environmental factors, such as the organization and ﬁnancing of the respective health care systems.
A taxonomy of hospital efﬁciency studies has several important, practical beneﬁts. Firstly, it can serve as an
early map to an unknown territory. Further, it can help decision-makers evaluate potential and existing DEA
models. Using our taxonomy, policy makers can, perhaps, more easily assemble new DEA models that best
meet their requirements via a step-by-step process: from selection of the ‘‘best’’ method, to the choice of input
and output categories, to the presentation of results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide an overview of DEA and
related techniques for efﬁciency measurement. In Section 3, we describe the taxonomy of efﬁciency studies and
our statistical methods. Section 4 contains the results of our cross-national comparisons, as well as other
methodological considerations. Sections 5–7 provide a summary of the input and output categories used and
the leading contributors in this area, with the ﬁnal section concluding the paper.2. Data envelopment analysis and related techniques
We begin with some basic terminology for efﬁciency measurement. A ﬁrm is considered technically efficient
if it produces the maximum feasible output for a ﬁxed level of inputs, or, alternatively, uses the minimum
resources to produce a given level of output. Much of the seminal work on technical efﬁciency and its
relationship to production functions is due to Farrell [83].
Allocative efﬁciency is more encompassing than technical efﬁciency in that it requires information on the
relative prices of inputs and outputs. A ﬁrm is allocatively efﬁcient if it produces a given level of outputs at the
lowest possible cost, or, alternatively, maximizes beneﬁt (often revenue) for a given cost constraint. Technical
efﬁciency implies a minimum of wasted resources; importantly, it does not imply cost minimization or beneﬁt
maximization.
Efﬁciency measurement techniques in general consist of four classes, depending on whether they are
parametric or non-parametric, and whether they are deterministic or stochastic. Each set of techniques has its
own strengths and weaknesses. Parametric techniques are regression-based approaches in general, and assume
a speciﬁc functional form for the frontier, whereas non-parametric techniques do not. Parametric techniques
are susceptible to model misspeciﬁcation, as the efﬁciency scores are sensitive to distributional assumptions
regarding the error term [84].
Deterministic methods do not contain a random error component. Hence, they may be sensitive to extreme
observations since they assume that the observed distance to the frontier is due to inefﬁciency. Stochastic
ARTICLE IN PRESS
L. O’Neill et al. / Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 42 (2008) 158–189160methods are less sensitive to outliers since part of the distance to the frontier can be attributed to random
error.
In Section 2.1, we outline the deterministic non-parametric DEA approach and then discuss the parametric
stochastic Frontier analysis (SFA) in Section 2.2. The Malmquist index is explained in Section 2.3.
2.1. Data envelopment analysis
The DEA formulation presented in (1a)–(1c) is also known as the CCR ratio model after its inventors,
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes [85]. In the present paper, however, we use the term ‘‘DEA’’ in its broadest
possible sense to refer to an entire class of non-parametric, deterministic techniques for efﬁciency
measurement.
As many readers may know, the basic DEA model can be formulated as follows: Suppose there are n
decision-making units (DMUs), each of which uses m inputs to produce s outputs. Let xij be the amount of
input i (i ¼ 1,y, m) used by DMUj ( j ¼ 1,y, n); and, let yrj be the amount of output r (r ¼ 1,y, s) produced
by DMUj ( j ¼ 1,y, n). Note that, in all DEA models, xij and yrj are treated as constants. The variables ur
(r ¼ 1,y, s) and vi (i ¼ 1,y, m) are weights. The technical efﬁciency of DMU0 is then given by
max ¼
Ps
r¼1uryr0Pm
i¼1vixi0
(1a)
subject to
Ps
r¼1uryrjPm
i¼1vixij
p1 for j ¼ 1; . . . ; n, (1b)
urX0; viX0 for r ¼ 1; . . . ; s; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m. (1c)
The set of constraints in Relation (1b) limits all efﬁciency scores to a maximum value of unity. The variables
ur and vi are stated in ‘‘efﬁciency units’’ that are obtained by solving the maximization problem; it evaluates
the behavior of each DMU0 relative to the performance of all j ¼ 1,y, n DMUs. To illustrate the logic of the
ratio model, suppose that the numerator in (1a) is ﬁxed. (This is feasible because every ratio has a
representative for an arbitrary value of the numerator.) For any such value, the denominator must be
minimized (subject to the constraints) as a necessary condition of maximization. Conversely, if the
denominator is ﬁxed ( 6¼0), then the numerator of (1a) must be maximized. Hence, the numerator and
denominator are jointly optimized. No other choice of weights can better the resulting efﬁciency score when
these same weights are assigned to all DMUs.
The CCR ratio model generalized the engineering-science deﬁnition of efﬁciency from its usual one-output-
to-one-input ratio in order that the resulting measure could comprehend multiple outputs and multiple inputs
without recourse to externally imposed weights. This model provided a basis for unifying DEA with long-
standing approaches to efﬁciency evaluation in other ﬁelds, most notably welfare economics and its concept of
‘‘Pareto–Koopmans’’ efﬁciency.1
The ratio model was identiﬁed as a fractional programming problem in Charnes et al. [85]. By choosing a
representative value for the denominator2, it can be replaced in its input oriented form by an equivalent linear
programming formulation as follows (the weight mr results from the weight ur in the Charnes–Cooper
transformation):
max
Xs
r¼1
mryr0 (2a)1This is similar to the concept of ‘‘technical efﬁciency’’, as deﬁned earlier. See Cooper et al. [86] for further details.
2This is known as the Charnes–Cooper transformation [87].
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r¼1
mryrj 
Xm
i¼1
vixijp0 for j ¼ 1; . . . ; n, (2b)
Xm
i¼1
vixi0 ¼ 1, (2c)
mrX0; viX0 for r ¼ 1; . . . ; s; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m. (2d)
An alternative, output-oriented model formulation results if, in (1a), the numerator is ﬁxed to 1 and the
denominator is minimized.
Taking the dual problem of (2a)–(2d) yields the input-oriented dual form of DEA, as follows:
min y (3a)
subject to
Xn
j¼1
xijljpyxi0 for i ¼ 1; . . . ;m, (3b)
Xn
j¼1
yrjljXyr0 for r ¼ 1; . . . ; s, (3c)
ljX0 for j ¼ 1; . . . ; n. (3d)
Here, variable y0 represents the radial efﬁciency of DMU0 and variable lj is the weight placed by DMU0 on
DMUj. Those DMUs for which lj40 comprise DMU0’s efficient reference set. Movement toward the best-
practice frontier is achieved by reducing current levels of inputs while maintaining the same level of outputs.
DMUs for which the optimal solution yo1 are inefﬁcient.
For some applications, the goal is to increase outputs for a ﬁxed quantity of inputs. The corresponding dual
form of the output-oriented model is given by
max f (4a)
subject to
Xn
j¼1
xijljpxi0 for i ¼ 1; . . . ;m, (4b)
Xn
j¼1
yrjlj  f yr0 for r ¼ 1; . . . ; s, (4c)
ljX0 for j ¼ 1; . . . ; n. (4d)
Here, DMUs for which the optimal solution f41 are inefﬁcient. The vast majority of DEA studies in health
care use the input-oriented model since the goal is to reduce costs rather than increase the volume of services
provided.
While the CCR envelopment model (3a)–(3d) assumes constant returns-to-scale (CRS), the model can be
easily modiﬁed to incorporate variable returns-to-scale (VRS) by adding the following convexity constraint:
Xn
j¼1
lj ¼ 1. (5)
This formulation is called, alternatively, the VRS model and the BCC model, after its developers, Banker,
Charnes, and Cooper [88].
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Fig. 1. Number of DEA hospital efﬁciency studies over time, and by country.
L. O’Neill et al. / Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 42 (2008) 158–189162Sherman [72] ﬁrst applied DEA to measure the efﬁciency of seven US teaching hospitals more than 20 years
ago. DEA has since been applied to other health care providers, including physicians [89,90], nursing homes
[91], and health maintenance organizations [92].
The pattern of DEA hospital efﬁciency studies over time is presented in Fig. 1. From 1984–1994, there were
30 published DEA papers involving US hospitals. By the late 1990s, the number of such studies seemed to
have peaked. Although the ﬁrst study of European hospitals [23] did not appear until 1994, such DEA
applications spread rapidly thereafter. Since 1998, Europe has passed the US in number of studies published
per year. Beginning in 1997, several studies from other countries have appeared, including Canada [32,68],
Kenya [39], Taiwan [14], and Turkey [22,70]. Clearly, the proliferation of DEA studies for measuring hospital
efﬁciency did not occur ‘‘overnight.’’ Rather, the original idea required adaptation and re-interpretation to
suit each context.
DEA’s main advantages for health care applications are its ﬂexibility and versatility; it requires no
information on relative prices, and can easily accommodate multiple inputs and outputs. It is also
computationally easy to use. Yet, these strengths also give rise to some practical limitations. For instance, the
lack of restrictions on prices can lead to difﬁculties. When the number of observations is small relative to the
sample size, efﬁciency scores can become inﬂated. A large proportion of ﬁrms may thus be identiﬁed as
efﬁcient due to a lack of sufﬁcient degrees of freedom. A need then arises to discriminate among efﬁcient units,
such as by incorporating information on the relative values of the inputs and outputs.
A number of techniques have been developed over time in an effort to extend DEA toward the measurement
of both allocative and technical efﬁciency. These include the cone-ratio [93] and assurance-region (AR) [94]
approaches, which impose reasonable bounds on the input and output weights in objective function (1a) and
relation (1b). When relative prices are known, then allocative efﬁciency can be estimated using allocative
efficiency DEA models, as ﬁrst developed by Fa¨re et al. [95].
Numerous extensions and diagnostics have been developed to address the limitations of deterministic
methods (for a bibliography, see Cooper et al. [96]). Stochastic DEA is a variation of the original DEA model
that can separate inefﬁciency from random error [97]. It has generated a good deal of work in recent years
[98,99].
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A number of studies have compared DEA with parametric techniques for efﬁciency measurement, most
notably SFA [17,25,26,38,40,41,100]. SFA is an econometric technique for estimating production functions
and measuring allocative and technical efﬁciency [101,102]. The basic model can be expressed as follows:
yi ¼ f ðxi;bÞ þ vi þ ui for i ¼ 1; . . . ;m. (6)
Here, yi (i ¼ 1,y, m) is the maximum output obtainable from xi, a vector of non-stochastic inputs; b is an
unknown parameter vector to be estimated; vi is statistical noise, assumed to be distributed as N(0,s
2); and ui
represents technical inefﬁciency, with uip0 [101,102].
Unlike ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression, SFA models the error term in two parts: The ﬁrst (ui)
measures the distance from the frontier (inefﬁciency), while the other (vi) measures statistical noise. As a
parametric technique, SFA results are less sensitive to extreme observations. However, it requires strong
assumptions about the distribution of the error terms, which makes it vulnerable to model misspeciﬁcation.
SFA measures both allocative and technical efﬁciency; hence, it requires information on relative prices.
Several studies have compared SFA and DEA for both European and US hospitals with mixed results. In
the European studies, there was generally broad agreement between DEA and SFA for overall levels of
inefﬁciency. However, some differences arose in efﬁciency scores for individual facilities. In a study of 232
English hospitals, for example, Jacobs [38] found a correlation of 0.42–0.63 between DEA and SFA scores,
where the discrepancy was attributed, in part, to statistical noise. Linna and Hakkinen [41] found similar
correlations (0.28–0.59) between the techniques in a study of 95 Finnish hospitals. In contrast, a study of 186
US hospitals by Chirikos and Sear [17] found very low correlations (0.13–0.33) between the two
methodologies. Whereas SFA suggested that smaller hospitals were more efﬁcient than larger ones, the
DEA model found just the opposite.
One reason given for the discrepancy involves how each model handles extreme observations [38]. SFA
results are based on average parameter values; hence, the effect of outliers tends to be smoothed away. In
contrast, DEA contains no statistical error term, and, thus, extreme observations can have a signiﬁcant impact
on the frontier. Several methods have recently been developed to address this issue, including the
‘‘envelopment map’’ as described in Cooper et al. [96], bootstrapping methods [103], and sensitivity analysis
[86].
Whereas the perceived advantages of SFA versus DEA have been well-documented, especially in the
economics literature, its potential drawbacks for hospital efﬁciency studies have received less attention. SFA,
for example, cannot readily identify the source of the inefﬁciency, which makes it difﬁcult for hospital
managers to take remedial action [100]. Does the inefﬁciency then stem from using the wrong mix of inputs
(allocative inefﬁciency), using too much of some inputs (technical inefﬁciency), or because it is too large or too
small (scale inefﬁciency)?
Unlike DEA, SFA cannot readily accommodate multiple outputs and inputs simultaneously. Hence, SFA
applications will typically use either one input (total cost) or one output (total revenue). Whereas it is possible
to use multivariate SFA to accommodate multiple dependent variables, the problem then becomes how to
combine residuals from the different models.
Another basic difference between the two techniques invovles the principle of optimization. DEA performs
a separate such step for each hospital, where the focus is on the individual institution. In contrast, SFA
requires only two optimization steps, regardless of the sample size: The ﬁrst estimates the parameters of the
production frontier, while the second estimates the distance of each hospital from the frontier. The primary
aim of SFA is to estimate empirical production functions for a collection of hospitals rather than measure
inefﬁciency for an individual facility. As such, SFA is better suited for health care policy analysis than for
managerial decision-making at a given hospital.
2.3. The Malmquist index
The Malmquist index is one of the most frequently used techniques to measure productivity changes over
time. First introduced by Sten Malmquist [104] in the context of consumer theory, it was later adapted to
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changes into changes in both technical efﬁciency and the best-practice frontier (also called ‘‘technology’’). The
main disadvantage of the Malmquist index is the necessity to compute the distance function. The distance
functions employed by Fa¨re et al. [23] are the reciprocal of the Farrell [83] output-oriented technical efﬁciency
measures, and are similar to the DEA output-oriented model [106]. Thus, a score of greater than one implies
productivity regress, whereas a score of less than one implies a positive gain in efﬁciency over time.
The Malmquist index can be further decomposed by disaggregating changes in technical efﬁciency into
changes in scale efﬁciency and input congestion [23]. In terms of computational steps, the index typically
requires solving six linear programs for each unit under analysis [73]. This technique was later extended to
measure both allocative and technical efﬁciency for the case where input prices are known [39].3. Description of taxonomy
An important distinction in hospital efﬁciency studies is whether the research measured technical efﬁciency
alone, or some combination of technical and allocative efﬁciencies. Allocative models assume that relative
prices are known and are reasonably stable, and that there is substitutability among the inputs. If the focus is
on the health care system (i.e., for health care policy), then it is usually preferable to measure allocative
efﬁciency, also referred to as ‘‘cost efﬁciency.’’ On the other hand, if the focus is on the individual hospital (i.e.,
for health care management), then it is often preferable to identify the source of the inefﬁciency in order to take
remedial action. The crux of the issue is whether to assign global prices or to give individual hospitals some
ﬂexibility with respect to the input and output weights in Objective Function (1a).
Assigning global prices to US hospitals can be problematic for a number of reasons. Although price data
may exist, they frequently do not reﬂect the actual costs of services provided, and, hence, may contain little, if
any, economic information [11,84].
Most US hospitals operate as free-standing businesses that compete with each other for patients, and there
is no central authority that sets budgets. Only 26% of US community hospitals are publicly ﬁnanced, while
approx. Fifteen percent are part of investor-owned chains [107]. Thus, in practice, many American hospitals
tend to act as if they were independent businesses. That is, they pursue strategies that maximize their own
individual welfare rather than that of a global hospital system. For example, one hospital may develop a
comparative advantage in neurosurgery or cardiac surgery in order to attract patients from nearby, competing
hospitals [108]. On the other hand, there is a high degree of horizontal integration among such hospitals, and
this may, to some degree, curtail the autonomy of individual facilities.
In addition, non-proﬁt hospitals cannot be assumed to be revenue-maximizers since their mission will
typically include other dimensions, such as providing charity care, research, and teaching. Hence, there are
good reasons to choose a model that allows for some ﬂexibility in determining the optimal set of ‘‘weights’’ for
the input and output categories in Objective Function (1a). However, giving hospitals total freedom with
respect to the relative weights may also be problematic since the DEA model may assign zero weights to
important inputs or outputs.
Our proposed taxonomy of efﬁciency studies is presented in Fig. 2, with a summary of the essential features
of each study listed in Tables 1 and 2. Studies were classiﬁed into four groups depending on the type of
efﬁciency measured (technical vs. allocative), and whether the study measured a single period or multiple time
periods. We thus obtain the following four groups of investigated studies: (1) technical efﬁciency with a single
time period; (2) technical efﬁciency with multiple time periods; (3) allocative efﬁciency with a single time
period; and (4) allocative efﬁciency with multiple time periods.
In practice, the distinction between allocative and technical efﬁciency is often a matter of degree, depending
on the amount of ﬂexibility given to the relative weights of the input and output categories in Objective
Function (1a). A study was considered to measure allocative efﬁciency if it used a global set of relative prices
for all hospitals. To illustrate, adding various cost components (e.g., labor, capital, and other operating
expenses) to obtain ‘‘total costs’’ would be an example of allocative efﬁciency [17].
The classiﬁcation in Fig. 2 is thus a necessary over-simpliﬁcation. Nevertheless, it does provide a useful
mental map of these studies, since one must know what the objective is prior to determining the best way to
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Cong.=Congestion; Eff.=Efficiency; Malm.=Malmquist Index
MFE=Multifactor Efficiency; MOO=Multi-objective Optimization
N=79
All
Studies
Multiple Time Periods?
YesYes
No
NoNo
DEA
DEA w/ Cong.
DEA w/ MFE
DEA w/MOO
DEA & Scale
DEA & Translog
Ratio Measures
DEA
Group 3 (N=12)
Allocative DEA
Stochastic DEA
DEA & SFA
Stochastic DEA
Assurance Region
Single Price Model
DEA
DEA & SFA
Malmquist Index
DEA, SFA, & Malm.
Yes Measures Allocative Efficiency?
Includes
Allocative
Eff. (N=19)
Technical 
Efficiency
Only (N=60)
Group 1 (N=37)
DEA & Malm.
Group 2 (N=23)
Group 4 (N=7)
Fig. 2. Categorization of hospital efﬁciency studies and associated efﬁciency models.
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groups presented in Fig. 2.
Group 1:
Thirty-one of the 37 studies in this group used the ‘‘standard’’ DEA model, as deﬁned previously. Novel
applications and extensions include DEA with congestion [30], multifactor efﬁciency [55], multi-objective
optimization [7], scale efﬁciency [44], and translog cost functions [4]. Congestion in DEA occurs when
inefﬁciency is caused by excess resource use that generates a decline in output [95,109]. Grosskopf et al. [30]
examined congestion in teaching hospitals and found that 20 percent of overall inefﬁciency was due to the
excess use of residents. O’Neill [55] used multifactor efﬁciency to assess the performance of 27 urban hospitals
and found this technique offers several beneﬁts that enhance and complement existing performance measures
in DEA.
Multifactor efﬁciency is an alternative to radial super-efﬁciency that incorporates the slack values from the
super-efﬁcient model [55,110]. Banker et al. [4] compared the VRS–DEA model (see Eq. (5)) with translog cost
functions for measuring hospital efﬁciency and found that the former offers the advantage of distinguishing
scale efﬁciency from overall efﬁciency. Ozcan and McCue [62] showed that ﬁnancial ratios, constructed by
DEA, to assess the performance of 170 acute care non-proﬁt US hospitals were an effective overall ﬁnancial
performance measurement compared to standard ﬁnancial performance ratios. Nineteen of these facilities
were considered top performers based on the DEA model.
Group 2:
Fifteen of the 23 studies in this group used DEA alone to measure changes in technical efﬁciency over time.
Seven studies used DEA in combination with the Malmquist index [10,23,45,49,68,73,74]. One advantage of
this approach is that it can measure technological change (i.e., movement of the efﬁcient frontier) over time as
well as changes in the efﬁciency of individual facilities, e.g., hospitals. Ehreth [21] used various clinical
output–input ratios to measure efﬁciency changes over time. She found the technical efﬁciency measure to be
the most robust measure of those evaluated for the hospital example presented.
Using longitudinal data has several advantages compared with the use of cross-sectional data. Comparing
the same hospital with itself over multiple years provides additional insights, and a further validity check on
data accuracy. For pooled analysis, such a comparison may allow for increased discrimination among efﬁcient
units and the inclusion of additional variables. This is especially true for European studies that typically
involve fewer hospitals.
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Table 1
Summary of hospital efﬁciency studies that use DEA and technical efﬁciency (N ¼ 60)
Reference Group Year Country Efﬁciency
model
Type of
efﬁciency
No. of
DMUs
No. of input
categories
No. of output
categories
DMU–
categories ratio
Multiple
years
Mean efﬁciency
scores
Percent efﬁcient
DMUs
[5] 1 1995 US DEA Tech. 284 6 2 35.5 N 0.82 0.20
[11] 1 1996 US DEA Tech. 2246 7 6 172.8 N 0.83 0.21
[16] 1 1994 US DEA Tech. 189 2 2 47.3 N 0.65 N/A
[18] 1 1998 Spain DEA Tech. 94 4 8 7.8 N 0.94 0.53
[20] 1 1991 US DEA Tech. 105 9 2 9.5 N N/A 0.55
[22] 1 1997 Turkey DEA Tech. 573 3 3 95.5 N N/A 0.09
[24] 1 1996 US DEA Tech. 360 2 6 45.0 N 0.79 N/A
[27] 1 1987 US DEA Tech. 82 4 4 10.3 N 0.94 N/A
[28] 1 1993 US DEA Tech. 108 4 4 13.5 N 0.86 0.15
[29] 1 2001 US DEA Tech. 792 6 5 72.0 N 0.72 0.21
[31] 1 2003 US DEA Tech. 254 6 3 28.2 N 0.71 N/A
[32] 1 2001 Canada DEA Tech. 168 5 3 21.0 N 0.74 N/A
[33] 1 1994 US DEA Tech. 93 3 3 15.5 N 0.90 0.54
[36] 1 1995 UK DEA Tech. 75 6 6 6.3 N 0.97 0.75
[37] 1 1990 US DEA Tech. 213 5 3 26.6 N N/A 0.25
[39] 1 2002 Kenya DEA Tech. 54 11 8 2.8 N 0.96 0.74
[50] 1 1998 Norway &
US
DEA Tech. 228 3 5 28.5 N 0.92 N/A
[56] 1 1992 US DEA Tech. 40 3 5 5.0 N 0.85 0.23
[57] 1 1995 US DEA Tech. 319 4 2 53.2 N 0.86 0.19
[59] 1 1993 US DEA Tech. 3000 4 3 428.6 N N/A 0.45
[60] 1 1992 US DEA Tech. 3000 4 3 428.6 N N/A 0.43
[61] 1 1992 US DEA Tech. 1535 4 3 219.3 N 0.88 0.44
[63] 1 1996 US DEA Tech. 85 4 2 14.2 N 0.65 0.09
[65] 1 1992 US DEA Tech. 158 5 3 19.8 N 0.85 0.32
[70] 1 2000 Turkey DEA Tech. 80 6 3 8.9 N 0.88 0.45
[71] 1 1989 US DEA Tech. 159 7 6 12.2 N N/A 0.67
[72] 1 1984 US DEA Tech. 7 3 4 1.0 N N/A 0.71
[75] 1 1990 US DEA Tech. 41 4 4 5.1 N 0.95 0.27
[76] 1 1992 US DEA Tech. 41 6 5 3.7 N 0.98 N/A
[78] 1 1996 US DEA Tech. 170 4 2 28.3 N 0.78 0.11
[79] 1 1992 US DEA Tech. 22 1 3 5.5 N 0.68 0.14
[30] 1 2001 US DEA w/
Congestion
Tech. 213 6 5 19.4 N 0.82 N/A
[55] 1 1998 US DEA w/ MFE Tech. 27 4 4 3.4 N 0.98 0.55
[7] 1 1987 US DEA & MOO Tech. 160 3 15 8.9 N N/A 0.64
[44] 1 1990 US DEA & Scale Tech. 55 3 2 11.0 N 0.92 0.38
[4] 1 1986 US DEA &
Translog
Tech. 114 4 3 16.3 N N/A 0.41
[62] 1 1996 US Ratio
Measures
Tech. 170 N/A N/A N/A N N/A 0.11
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[8] 2 1988 US DEA Tech. 52 4 9 4.0 Y 0.96 N/A
[9] 2 1993 US DEA Tech. 89 5 5 8.9 Y 0.96 0.68
[12] 2 1998 US DEA Tech. 1545 7 6 118.8 Y 0.93 N/A
[14] 2 1998 Taiwan DEA Tech. 6 3 2 1.2 Y 0.95 0.34
[15] 2 2000 US DEA Tech. 80 4 2 13.3 Y 0.78 0.12
[19] 2 1991 US DEA Tech. 300 20 31 5.9 Y N/A N/A
[34] 2 2000 US DEA Tech. 20 4 2 3.3 Y 0.88 0.35
[35] 2 2002 Austria DEA Tech. 31 4 2 5.2 Y 0.96 0.45
[42] 2 1994 US DEA Tech. 1535 4 3 219.3 Y 0.88 0.44
[43] 2 1996 Norway DEA Tech. 46 3 8 4.2 Y 0.94 0.31
[54] 2 1983 US DEA Tech. 16 1 3 4.0 Y 0.90 0.31
[58] 2 1994 US DEA Tech. 124 6 2 15.5 Y 0.95 0.60
[64] 2 1997 UK DEA Tech. 75 6 6 6.3 Y 0.92 0.51
[66] 2 2000 Spain DEA Tech. 141 4 8 11.8 Y 0.93 0.58
[77] 2 1999 US DEA Tech. 316 4 2 52.7 Y 0.83 0.14
[10] 2 1995 US DEA &
Malmquist
Tech. 1545 7 6 118.8 Y 0.87 N/A
[23] 2 1994 Sweden DEA &
Malmquist
Tech. 17 2 3 3.4 Y N/A N/A
[45] 2 1999 UK DEA &
Malmquist
Tech. 75 5 4 8.3 Y 0.90 N/A
[49] 2 2000 UK DEA &
Malmquist
Tech. 23 5 4 2.6 Y N/A N/A
[68] 2 2003 Canada DEA &
Malmquist
Tech. 15 4 1 3.0 Y 0.93 0.20
[73] 2 2001 Spain DEA &
Malmquist
Tech. 20 4 5 2.2 Y 0.92 0.48
[74] 2 2000 Austria DEA &
Malmquist
Tech. 22 3 2 4.4 Y 0.95 0.56
[21] 2 1994 US Ratio
Measures
Tech. N/A N/A N/A N/A Y N/A N/A
Tech. ¼ technical; MFE ¼ mult-factor efﬁciency; MOO ¼ multi-objective optimization.
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Table 2
Summary of hospital efﬁciency studies that use DEA and allocative efﬁciency (N ¼ 19)
Reference Group Year Country Efﬁciency
model
Type of
efﬁciency
No. of
DMUs
No. of input
categories
No. of output
categories
DMU–categories
ratio
Multiple
years
Mean efﬁciency
scores
Percent efﬁcient
DMUs
[1] 3 1999 Greece Allocative
DEA
Alloc. 98 8 4 8.2 N 0.75 0.22
[2] 3 2001 Greece Allocative
DEA
Alloc. 98 8 4 8.2 N 0.81 0.44
[51] 3 1990 US Allocative
DEA
Alloc. 60 5 5 6.0 N N/A 0.40
[52] 3 1992 US Allocative
DEA
Alloc. 300 1 9 30.0 N N/A 0.44
[53] 3 1995 US Allocative
DEA
Alloc. 314 4 8 26.2 N N/A N/A
[25] 3 2001 Greece DEA & SFA Alloc. 91 1 4 18.2 N 0.77 0.20
[38] 3 2001 UK DEA & SFA Alloc. 232 1 11 19.3 N 0.94 0.47
[41] 3 1998 Finland DEA & SFA Alloc. 95 1 8 10.6 N 0.89 N/A
[69] 3 1993 US Stochastic
DEA
Alloc. 40 4 4 5.0 N 0.93 0.63
[13] 3 1994 US Allocative
DEA
Tech. &
Alloc.
123 6 3 13.7 N 0.94 0.76
[67] 3 2000 Spain Assurance
Region
Tech. &
Alloc.
94 4 8 7.8 N 0.97 0.73
[3] 3 2004 Spain Single Price
Model
Tech. &
Alloc.
27 2 4 4.5 N 0.91 0.56
[6] 4 2003 Norway DEA Tech. &
Alloc.
48 4 2 8.0 Y 0.80 N/A
[48] 4 1999 UK DEA Tech. &
Alloc.
23 5 4 2.6 Y 0.97 N/A
[17] 4 2000 US DEA & SFA Tech. &
Alloc.
186 6 4 18.6 Y 0.97 N/A
[26] 4 1996 Spain DEA & SFA Tech. &
Alloc.
75 3 11 5.4 Y 0.96 N/A
[40] 4 1998 Finland DEA, SFA &
Malm.
Tech. &
Alloc.
43 1 7 5.4 Y 0.93 N/A
[46] 4 2000 UK Malmquist
Index
Tech. &
Alloc.
75 5 4 8.3 Y 0.90 N/A
[47] 4 2003 Greece Malmquist
Index
Tech. &
Alloc.
30 3 3 5.0 Y 0.98 0.30
Alloc. ¼ allocative; Tech. ¼ technical; Malm. ¼ Malmquist index; SFA ¼ stochastic Frontier analysis.
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Group 3 studies used a variety of approaches to extend the standard DEA model toward allocative
efﬁciency. As mentioned previously, three studies of European hospitals used DEA in combination with SFA
[25,38,41]. In spite of the many beneﬁts of stochastic DEA, only one study, by Retzlaff-Roberts and Morey
[69], used this approach. They applied a goal-programming version of stochastic allocative DEA to 40 US
hospitals, as this technique offered the advantage of separating statistical noise from inefﬁciency. They
identiﬁed 15 of the 40 facilities as signiﬁcantly inefﬁcient.
In a study of 94 Spanish hospitals, Puig-Junoy [67] used the AR approach, which sets reasonable bounds on
relative prices. The author concluded that Spanish acute care hospital costs were, on average, 24.5% higher
than needed if all facilities were operating on their cost efﬁciency frontiers. Privately ﬁnanced hospitals were
found to be more efﬁcient than public and non-proﬁt institutions. The degree of market competition
contributed positively to increased levels of technical efﬁciency.
Six studies [1,2,13,51–53] used allocative DEA, an extension of standard DEA, when relative prices are
known and relatively stable [95]. Ballestero and Maldonado [3] applied the Single Price Model, which derives a
common set of DEA prices, to rank the activities of 27 Spanish hospitals. They found ten globally efﬁcient
DMUs and 11 scale efﬁcient DMUs.
Group 4:
Five of the seven studies in Group 4 used DEA in conjunction with another technique such as SFA [17,26], the
Malmquist index [46,47] or both [40]. These studies required a more complex design than those using cross-
sectional data. Most included comparisons or extensions of these methodologies. Linna [40] applied four different
DEA models, two SFA models, and one Malmquist productivity index model to measure the cost efﬁciency of
Finnish hospitals from 1988 to 1994. They found that the choice of modelling technique did not affect the results.
Maniadakis and Thanassoulis extended the Malmquist index to accommodate prices in their studies of 75 English
hospitals [46] and 30 Greek hospitals [47]. They showed, for example, that, in Greece, productivity regressed in the
year after reforms but progressed thereafter. The net progress was due to both inputs and costs.
3.1. Statistical methods
Studies were classiﬁed into three groups based on their country of origin: Europe (n ¼ 25), US (n ¼ 48), and
other countries (n ¼ 6). Statistical tests were used to identify signiﬁcant differences between Europe and the
US for various study characteristics: number of DMUs, input categories, output categories, allocative
efﬁciency (Y/N), multiple time periods (Y/N), average efﬁciency score, and the percentage of efﬁcient units
(see Table 3). The Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to test for signiﬁcant differences in the ordinal variables,
while the chi-squared test was used for categorical variables. Several studies used alternative model
speciﬁcations. In these cases, the number of input and output categories was based on the ‘‘full model,’’ with
all categories included. Categories that were aggregated prior to solving the DEA were counted as one
category. For example, ‘‘total costs’’ was considered a single category, even though it included both ‘‘labor’’
and ‘‘material costs’’ [41].Table 3
Cross-national comparisons of hospital DEA studies
Europe US Other countries Difference: USEurope P-value
Number of studies (N ¼ 79) 25 48 6
Study characteristics
DMUs 75 440 149 365.1 0.001
Inputs 3.8 4.8 5.5 1.0 0.110
Outputs 5.4 4.7 3.2 0.7 0.041
Inclusive allocative efﬁciency 52% 12% 0% 40% 0.000
Multi-year 60% 25% 33% 35% 0.006
Average efﬁciency score 91% 86% 89% 5% 0.050
% Efﬁcient 47% 37% 37% 10% 0.081
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and 2). Efﬁciency results were typically reported for two or more groups. In these cases, a weighted average
was computed in which the efﬁciency scores were weighted by their respective sample sizes (e.g., for teaching
and non-teaching hospitals). In order to provide a consistent basis for comparison, we used the ‘‘pure
technical efﬁciency’’ scores wherever possible. These are equivalent to the VRS–DEA scores. When these were
not available, we employed the ‘‘technical efﬁciency’’ scores (equivalent to the CCR model), followed by
‘‘overall efﬁciency’’ scores.4. Results of cross-national comparisons
4.1. General findings
As shown in Table 3, signiﬁcant differences exist between Europe and the US in terms of important study
characteristics. Fifty-two percent of European studies incorporated allocative efﬁciency, compared with 12%
of US studies. Sixty percent of European studies used panel data, compared with 25% of the US studies. Of
those studies that used panel data, eight of 15 (53%) of the European studies used the Malmquist index
approach. In contrast, only one of 15 US studies (7%) did so [10].
Average efﬁciency scores and the percentage of efﬁcient hospitals were both slightly higher for European
studies (91% vs. 86%; p ¼ 0.05) and (47% vs. 37%, p ¼ 0.08), respectively. The average number of hospitals
was signiﬁcantly larger in US studies (440 vs. 75; po0.01). European studies tended to use slightly fewer input
categories (3.8 vs. 4.8; p ¼ 0.110) but more output categories (5.4 vs. 4.7; po0.05).
European studies were signiﬁcantly more likely to use panel data than were US studies. Panel data offer
several advantages over cross-sectional data, especially for measuring the impact of changes in hospital
reimbursement. During the 1990s, many European countries implemented market-based reforms through
alternative systems of hospital ﬁnancing [111]. For example, countries such as Austria and Germany switched
from a day-based to a diagnosis-related groups (DRG)-based ﬁnancing system of inpatients, which was ﬁrst
implemented in the US [112–114]. DRGs are a classiﬁcation of inpatient cases into clinical groupings based on
expected resource use. Classiﬁcation is based on variables such as: major organ system, age, sex, whether
surgery was performed, and whether complications or co-morbidities were present.
Several European studies (e.g., [6,26,35,45,49,74]) have used DEA to measure potential changes in technical
efﬁciency over time as a result of new ﬁnancing systems. Sommersgutter–Reichmann [74] used the Malmquist
index to measure changes in efﬁciency for 22 Austrian hospitals and found a signiﬁcant positive shift in
efﬁciency due to the new system. Another study of 31 Austrian hospitals [35] over a similar time period found
no signiﬁcant change in efﬁciency. Efﬁciency gains were found following changes in hospital ﬁnancing for
several other countries, however, including Spain [26], the United Kingdom [45], and Norway [6]. On the other
hand, it was not clear why the Malmquist index was seldom used in US studies compared to European efforts.
Due to a larger American population, US studies had signiﬁcantly more hospitals (440 vs. 74) and hospitals-
per-category (53 vs. 8; po0.001) than did the European studies. This may partially explain the observed
difference in efﬁciency scores between the European and US studies. When the number of observations is
small relative to the number of input and output categories, efﬁciency scores will tend to be biased upwards.
According to the ‘‘Golden Rule’’ of DEA, the sample should have at least three times as many DMUs as the
total number of output and input categories [115]. Only six studies had a ratio of less than three observations
per category [14,39,48,49,72,73]. One caveat for the use of these statistical tests is the assumption that the
current studies comprise a random sample from an inﬁnite population. In this case, however, the population
of hospital efﬁciency studies is obviously ﬁnite.4.2. Other methodological considerations
4.2.1. Input vs. output orientation
Hospital managers and policy-makers generally have more control over their inputs than their outputs, and,
in a majority of countries, the emphasis is on controlling costs rather than increasing demand for health care.
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(3a)–(3d).
Burgess and Wilson [10–12] used both input- and output-oriented DEA models in their studies of US
hospitals. For example, they showed that since technical inefﬁciency could be reﬂected in radial, slack,
or scale inefﬁciency, it was difﬁcult to generalize which hospital ownership type was more or less efﬁcient than
another [11].
The Malmquist index approach commonly employs the output-oriented DEA model (see (4a)–(4d)). For
this approach, a score of less than one indicates technological progress, whereas a score greater than one
indicates regress. In this regard, Fa¨re et al. [23] investigated 17 Swedish hospitals and found a wide variation in
performance during the period 1970–1985. Technical inefﬁciency was present while technical regress was fairly
common. A recent study by O’Neill and Dexter [108] used an output-oriented DEA model to identify best-
practices in market capture for eight different surgical specialties. The goal was to increase surgical volumes by
identifying overlooked surgical markets.4.2.2. DEA under constant and variable returns-to scale
About half the efﬁciency studies used the CRS model, which assumes CRS. The remainder used either
VRS–DEA or both VRS and CRS, as given by (3a)–(3d) and (5), respectively. Numerous studies have found
evidence of scale economies in hospital efﬁciency [1,49,56,70]. Athanassopoulos et al. [1], for example, found
that 68% of rural, Greek hospitals could increase performance by expanding their scale of operations. Sahin
and Ozcan [70] found that efﬁcient hospitals in Turkey were almost twice as large as inefﬁcient ones, as
measured by number of beds. Ozcan [56] showed the effect of scale size on efﬁciency scores for US hospitals,
and recommended grouping hospitals by bed size.
Several studies [e.g., 11,34] applied both the VRS and CRS models in order to distinguish ‘‘scale efﬁciency’’
from ‘‘pure technical efﬁciency.’’ Maindiratta [44] introduced ‘‘size efﬁciency’’ in DEA, which is similar to the
concept of the ‘‘most productive scale size’’ (MPSS) for a ﬁxed level of production. The MPSS of an efﬁcient
unit refers to the point (on the efﬁcient frontier) at which maximum average productivity is achieved for a
given input/output mix [116]. At MPSS, constant returns to scale are operating; after reaching MPSS,
decreasing returns to scale set in.4.2.3. DEA with quality measures
Only six of 79 studies included quality measures, with four of these involving US efforts [19,52,53,55]. The
measures included ‘‘risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality’’ [52,53,55,70], ‘‘risk-adjusted readmissions’’ [19],
‘‘number of clinically active infections’’ [73], and ‘‘complications’’ [19]. Selected obstacles have precluded
quality considerations in efﬁciency studies, including the lack of a widely accepted quality measure, and the
reluctance of many providers to release outcomes data.
Some have argued that resource use seeming to be inefﬁcient, could enhance the quality of care, and that
apparent gains in efﬁciency may come at the expense of quality [117]. In a study of 41 US hospitals, for
example, Valdmanis [75] found that public hospitals were more efﬁcient than private, non-proﬁt facilities. She
hypothesized that the observed differences in efﬁciency may have been due to a lower quality of care in public
hospitals. While some have criticized hospital DEA studies for excluding quality measures [118], there is little
evidence that efﬁcient facilities provide better or worse quality care than their inefﬁcient counterparts. More
research is needed in this area, especially at the physician-level [89].5. Input categories
Hospital input categories fall into three broad sub-categories: capital investment, labor, and other operating
expenses. We thus further classiﬁed our input categories into the following sub-categories: ‘‘beds’’ (Section 5.1;
Table 4), ‘‘clinical staff’’ (Section 5.2; Table 5), ‘‘non-clinical staff’’ (Section 5.3; Table 6), ‘‘working hours’’
(Section 5.4), ‘‘services offered’’ (Section 5.5), ‘‘costs’’ (Section 5.6; Tables 7–9), and ‘‘atypical and speciﬁc
input categories’’ (Section 5.7).
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input sub-categories. For example in Table 7, studies [2,16] both consider operating expenses measuring the
value of non-labor inputs. This is indicated by an ‘‘X’’ at the intersection of the respective row and column.5.1. Beds
The number of fully staffed hospital beds is most often used as a proxy for hospital size and capital
investment. Fifty-ﬁve of the 79 studies included the number of beds as an input category. Three of the studies
[25,38,40] that did not include ‘‘beds’’ used only one input category, ‘‘hospital costs.’’ Each of these studies
also used SFA along with DEA. As noted previously, SFA cannot readily accommodate multiple inputs and
outputs. This may explain why ‘‘beds’’ was excluded as an input from these studies.
Several studies disaggregated hospital beds into acute-care and long-term care, acute and intensive care unit
(ICU) beds, long-term beds, and the number of beds and wards (see Table 4). Sherman [72], for example, used
the ‘‘number of bed-days available.’’ DesHarnais et al. [19] distinguished between ‘‘acute beds,’’ ‘‘pediatric
beds,’’ ‘‘obstetric beds,’’ ‘‘psychiatric beds,’’ ‘‘sub-acute/long-term care beds,’’ and ‘‘intensive care/other
special beds.’’5.2. Clinical staff
About two-thirds of hospital operating costs are due to payroll expenses. Labor costs vary signiﬁcantly by
geographic region; hence, the majority of studies included the ‘‘number of clinical staff’’ as a proxy for ‘‘labor
costs’’ (see Table 5). Most studies that did not include ‘‘clinical staff’’ used ‘‘labor costs’’ instead. Hospital
clinical staff consists of physicians, nurses, and other health/medical personnel. Several studies disaggregated
‘‘physicians’’ into ‘‘specialist’’ and ‘‘generalist physicians’’ [22,70], ‘‘medical residents’’ [29–31], and the
‘‘surgeons’’ [1]. The nursing category has been further disaggregated into ‘‘registered nurses,’’ and ‘‘licensed
practical nurses’’ in several studies [10–12,29–31].
Six studies [7,8,24,37,55,74] deﬁned ‘‘number of personnel’’ as a general labor input category. Hollingsworth
and Parkin [36] and Parkin and Hollingsworth [64] assigned atypical clinical labor parameters to inputs. These
included ‘‘trained, learning, and other nurses,’’ ‘‘junior and senior non-nursing medical and dental staff,’’ and
‘‘professional, technical, administrative, and clerical staff.’’5.3. Non-clinical staff
Several studies included the number of ‘‘non-clinical staff’’ as a hospital input. This category included
‘‘technical, managerial, and other staff’’ (see Table 6). Sexton et al. [71] used ‘‘number of health technical
staff,’’ while Kirigia et al. [39] employed ‘‘number of technical and technological staff’’ as input categories.
Eight studies [2,14,32,39,47–49,56] considered administrative staff in their input set.
Four studies [9–12] added the ‘‘number of non-clinical staff’’ as an input category, two [18,67] included
‘‘number of other non-sanitary staff,’’ and 15 studies [5,6,26,29–31,39,43,45,46,50,58,66,73,76] considered
‘‘number of other staff.’’Table 4
Input categories: number of beds
Study (citation number) [1–3,5,8,13,15,18–20,22,24,26,29–36,42,43,45,46,48–53,55–61,63–67,69,70,73,74,76–78] [37] [9–12]
Beds
No. of beds X
No. of acute beds X
No. of acute and ICU beds X
No. of long-term hospital beds X
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Input categories: clinical staff
[1] [2] [5] [6,26,50] [8,32,48,49] [9,66,73] [10–12] [14,18,33,45–47,67] [15,34,42,57,59,60,61,63,77,78] [19] [22] [27,28] [29–31] [36,64] [39] [43] [56] [58] [65] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [75] [76]
Physician
No. of physicians X X X X X X X X X X
No. of physicians plus house staff X
No. of part-time physicians X
No. of surgeons X
No. of specialized medical
doctors/attendings
X X X
No. of general medical doctors X X X
No. of doctors in laboratory
examinations
X
No. of medical residents/interns X X X
No. of medical ofﬁcers/
pharmacists/dentists
X
No. of provider staff (physicians,
psychologists)
X X
Nurses
No. of nurses and/or nursing staff X* X X X X X X* X X X* X
No. of registered nurses X X X X
No. of licensed practical nurses X X X X*
No. of nursing support staff X X* X
No. of trained, learning, and
other nurses
X
Medical/clinical/health staff
No. of non-physician staff X X X X*
No. of non-physician and part-
time staff
X X
No. of professional allied health
staff
X X
No. of non-professional health
staff
X
No. of medical/clinical/health
staff
X X
No. of junior/senior non-nursing
medical and dental staff
X
No. of long term care staff X
No. of stretchers X
No. of other medical/clinical/
health staff
X X
Combined into one input category.
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Table 6
Input categories: non-clinical staff
[1] [2] [5,6,26,29–31,43,45,46,50,58,66,73] [9–12] [14] [18,67] [19] [32,48,49] [39] [47] [56] [70] [71] [76]
Technical staff
No. of health-technical staff X
No. of ancillary technical staff X
No. of technical and technological staff X
Management and administrative staff
No. of clinical ofﬁcers X
No. of management staff X
No. of administrative staff X X X X
No. of administrative and other staff X
No. of general and administrative staff X
Other staff
No. of non-clinical staff X
No. of other non-sanitary staff X
No. of house staff X
No. of supporting staff X
No. of subordinate staff X
No. of ancillary service staff X
No. of other professionals X
No. of other staff X X X
Combined with another input category of Table 5 (‘‘no. of nursing and management staff’’).
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Table 7
Input categories: capital investment and operating expenses
[2,16] [4,36,37,64] [5,6,15,34,42,55–61,63,65,77,78] [17] [19] [25,40] [27,28,69,75,76] [51] [52] [54]
Operating expenses
Total operating expenses, excluding salary, interest and depreciation X
Operating expenses measuring the value of non-labor inputs X
Capital charge
Total costs of the resources (staff earnings, operating expenses, supplies) X
Total inpatient costs X
Total other inpatient charges X
Total other expenses X
Fixed costs
Capital/capital assets/capital charge/capital costs X X
Net plan assets X X
Total interest expenses X
Total depreciation X
Total deprecation, interest, and fees X
Annual expenditures
Total annual expenditures X
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Table 8
Input categories: labor costs
[1] [3] [4,44] [7,16,23] [17] [20] [35] [48,49] [52] [53]
General labor costs
General labor costs, including salary and beneﬁts X X X
Nursing staff costs
Expenditures for salaries and beneﬁts for nurses X
Nursing services dollars X
Wages and salary to patient care staff X
Registered nurse salaries X
Licensed practical nurse salaries X
Other nursing salaries X
Medical staff costs
Expenses for medical staff X
Expenses for para-medical staff X
Expenses for specialists X
Total non-nursing medical staff costs X
Expenditures for graduate medical education X X
Other staff costs
Expenses for administrative staff X
Expenditures for salaries and beneﬁts for other personnel X
Expenditures for fees X X
Expenditures for all ‘‘other’’ X X
Wages and salary to non-patient care staff X
Administrative and general services dollars X
L. O’Neill et al. / Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 42 (2008) 158–1891765.4. Working hours
The ‘‘number of working hours’’ was a seldom-used input category for hospital efﬁciency analyses. Notable
exceptions are, for example, Burgess and Wilson [9] as well as Linna and Ha¨kkinen [41]; both studies included
‘‘physician working hours.’’ Dittman et al. [20] and Quellette and Vierstraete [68] took ‘‘nursing hours’’ and
‘‘non-physician hours,’’ respectively, into account.
5.5. Services offered
The number of hospital services has also been used as a proxy for capital investment. This was most
common for studies of US hospitals since the necessary data are published in the American Hospital
Association (AHA) annual survey [119]. In the non-US studies, however, this category was generally not
included as input. Fifteen studies [5,15,34,37,42,56–61,63,65,77,78] used ‘‘service mix’’ as a capital input.
Service mix is the total number of diagnostic and special services for both inpatients and outpatients. O0Neill
[55] included the ‘‘number of technological services’’ as an input category. This is a measure of a hospital’s
technological complexity, as well as its capacity to perform complicated surgical procedures such as bypass
surgery and organ transplants.
5.6. Costs
The bulk of a hospital’s operating costs are due to labor and salaries and other expenses that vary
signiﬁcantly by geographic region. Accurate data on capital investment is difﬁcult to obtain, creating the
need to use proxy categories, such as ‘‘beds’’ and ‘‘services.’’ Thus, practical considerations have often
precluded the use of cost data. Nevertheless, many studies have included various types of cost data in their
input set. These can be divided into the following subcategories: ‘‘operating expenses and capital investment’’
(Section 5.6.1), ‘‘labor costs’’ (Section 5.6.2), and ‘‘supply and non-labor costs’’ (Section 5.6.3).
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Table 9
Input categories: supply and non-labor costs
[1] [2] [4,44] [6] [7,20] [8] [23] [32] [36,64] [39] [41] [66,73] [68] [71] [72] [74]
Equipment costs
Total costs of equipment X* X
Total expenditures for equipment and furniture X
Total costs of maintenance of equipment, vehicles, and buildings X
Medical supply costs
Medical supply costs/medical expenses X X
Total expenses for external medical services X
Total costs of supplies and purchased services X
Total costs of services and supplies of all types X
Non-pharmaceutical supply costs X
Food costs
Total costs of food and rations X
Drug and pharmaceutical costs
Total costs of drugs and supplies X
Pharmaceutical supply costs X X X X
Material costs
Total costs of purchased material X* X
Non-labor costs
Total non-labor costs X
Non-payroll expenses X
Real non-labor expenditures X
Other costs
Other supply costs X
Total other costs X
Other direct expenses/dollars X
Ancillary services dollars X
Combined into one input category.
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Sixteen US studies included ‘‘operating expenses excluding payroll, capital, and depreciation’’ as an input
category [5,6,15,34,42,55–61,63,65,77,78], as shown in Table 7. This category is commonly reported in the
AHA Annual Survey [119]. Five studies [27,28,69,75,76] used ‘‘net plant assets’’ as an input category, while
Morey et al. [51] deﬁned ‘‘total annual expenditures’’ as the cost input, apart from ‘‘net plant assets.’’ Three
studies [36,37,64] presented ‘‘capital assets’’ as an input category, while Chirikos and Sear [17] sub-divided
hospital costs into ‘‘total other inpatient charges,’’ ‘‘total other expenses,’’ ‘‘capital costs,’’ and ‘‘total
depreciation.’’
5.6.2. Labor costs
Most studies omitted ‘‘labor expenses’’ since these vary signiﬁcantly by region (see Table 8). Both US and
non-US studies accounted for this category at similar levels of use. Staff costs were variously sub-divided into
‘‘general labor,’’ ‘‘nursing staff,’’ ‘‘medical staff,’’ and ‘‘other staff.’’ Morey et al. [52] used a regional
adjustment factor to control for local variation in wage rates.
5.6.3. Supply and non-labor costs
‘‘Supply and non-labor costs’’ were included as an input category twice as frequently in non-US studies
since US-based efforts generally employed ‘‘operating expenses.’’ These costs were variously sub-divided into
‘‘equipment costs,’’ ‘‘medical supply costs,’’ ‘‘food costs,’’ ‘‘drug and pharmaceutical costs,’’ ‘‘material costs,’’
‘‘non-labor costs,’’ and ‘‘other costs’’ (see Table 9). Several authors employed ‘‘medical supply costs’’
[2,6,32,39,72,74] and ‘‘drug and pharmaceutical costs’’ [1,2,36,39,64,71] in their input data set.
5.7. Atypical and specific input categories
Atypical input categories were found in two studies. Valdmanis [76] and Grosskopf and Valdmanis [27]
deﬁned ‘‘number of admissions’’ as an input category, while Maniadakis et al. [45] and Maniadakis and
Thanassoulis [46] used ‘‘cubic metres of the hospital building.’’ Morey et al. [51] added ‘‘type of ownership’’ to
their input set.
Young [79] considered ‘‘labor hours per average daily census,’’ while Jacobs [38] introduced ‘‘cost index’’ as
an input. Sahin and Ozcan [70] did the same with ‘‘revolving funds expenditure,’’ while Ozcan [56] used
‘‘number of full-time-equivalents excluding physicians,’’ ‘‘physicians and dentists on salary,’’ ‘‘physicians on
the medical staff,’’ and ‘‘teaching full-time-equivalents.’’
Three studies [28,37,51] included the DRGs ‘‘case mix index’’ as an input, which captures the variation in
both the complexity and resource-intensity of inpatient cases. In general, however, use of this factor as an
input should be avoided since it is more a characteristic of hospital outputs.
6. Output categories
In order to handle the variety of hospital output categories found in the literature, we identiﬁed four sub-
categories: (1) ‘‘medical visits, cases, patients, and surgeries’’ (Section 6.1; Table 10), (2) ‘‘inpatient days’’
(Section 6.2; Table 11), (3) ‘‘admissions, discharges, and services’’ (Section 6.3; Table 11), and (4) ‘‘atypical,
teaching, and speciﬁc output categories’’ (Section 6.4; Table 12).
Tables 10–12 contain the outputs and their sub-categories. The logic of these tables corresponds to that used
to construct tables of the input categories.
6.1. Medical visits, cases, patients, and surgeries
The vast majority of studies included outpatient visits as an output category (see Table 10). Eleven studies
[3,19,29,30,36,45,46,52,53,64,76] disaggregated outpatient visits into ‘‘emergency’’ and ‘‘non-emergency.’’
Twelve studies [18,22,24,27,28,31,33,51,67,69,75,76] included ‘‘surgeries’’ as an output factor, while seven
[9–12,26,29,30] distinguished between ‘‘inpatient surgeries’’ and ‘‘outpatient surgeries.’’
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Table 10
Outpatient categories: medical visits, cases, patients, and surgeries
[1,2] [3,36,64] [5,6,14,15,25,32,34,42,50,55,56–61,63,65,66,70,73,77,78] [8] [9–12] [18,67] [19] [22] [23] [24] [26] [27,28,33,51,69,75] [29,30] [31] [39] [40,41] [43] [45,46] [48,49] [52] [53] [68] [74] [76]
Medical visits
No. of outpatient visits X X X X X X X X X X X X
No. of outpatient and emergency visits X X X
No. of emergency room visits X X X X X X X X
No. of special clinic visits X
No. of maternal, child health, family
planning visits
X
No. of dental care visits X
No. of scheduled and follow-up visits X
No. of doctor visits X
Cases
No. of cases X
No. of day cases X
No. of cases treated in major DRG
categories
X
No. of cases treated in non-major DRG
categories
X
Patients
No. of inpatients X X X
No. of outpatients X X
No. of medical patients X X X
No. of subacute/long-term patients X
No. of surgical patients X X X
No. of accident and emergency patients X
No. of maternity patients X
No. of newborns delivered X
No. of normal newborns delivered X
No. of abnormal newborns delivered X
Surgeries
No. of surgeries X X X X X X
No. of inpatient surgeries X X X
No. of outpatient surgeries X X X X X X
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Table 11
Output categories: inpatient days
[4,50,72] [5,9,20,35,37,40,41,47,58,65] [10–12] [14] [17] [18] [23,32] [24] [25] [26] [27,51,69,75] [28] [36] [43] [44] [52,53] [54] [56] [66] [67,73] [76]
General inpatient days
No. of inpatient days X
No. of Medicare inpatient days X X
No. of Non-Medicare inpatient days X
No. of Medicaid inpatient days X
No. of simple/general/medical inpatient days X X X X X
Acute inpatient days
No. of acute care inpatient days X X X X X X X
No. of acute medical inpatient days X
No. of acute surgical inpatient days X
No. of acute medical-surgical inpatient days X
No. of sub-acute inpatient days X X X
No. of intensive care inpatient days X X X X X X X X X
No. of complex inpatient days X
Long-time care inpatient days
No. of chronic care inpatient days X
No. of long-term care inpatient days X X X X X
No. of long-term care and other inpatient days X
No. of rehabilitation days X
Special hospital division inpatient days
No. of surgical inpatient days X X X X X
No. of obstetric inpatient days X
No. of obstetrics and gynaecology inpatient days X X
No. of psychiatric inpatient days X
No. of maternity inpatient days X
No. of newborn inpatient days X
No. of paediatric inpatient days X X X X
Age group specific inpatient days
No. of adult/routine-aged inpatient days X X
No. of elderly inpatient days X
No. of inpatient days for certain age groups X
Other inpatient days
No. of other inpatient days X X X X
Combined into one input category.
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Table 12
Output categories: admissions, discharges, and services
[1,2,47] [3] [6,7,9,15,20,23,24,32–35,42,45,46,52,53,57,59–61,63,70,77,78] [10–12] [13] [17,26,40,41] [18,67] [25] [37] [39] [55] [56] [64]
Admissions
No. of admissions X X
No. of general medical admissions X
No. of paediatric admissions X
No. of maternity admissions X
No. of amenity ward admissions X
Discharges
No. of discharges X X X
No. of Medicare discharges with DRG-High X
No. of Medicare discharges with DRG-Medium X
No. of Medicare discharges with DRG-Low X
No. of Non-Medicare discharges X
No. of medical discharges X
No. of acute medical discharges X X
No. of medical-surgical acute care discharges X
No. of medical-surgical intensive care discharges X
No. of surgical discharges X
No. of acute surgical discharges X X
No. of acute care inpatient discharges X
No. of obstetrics and gynaecology discharges X
No. of maternity discharges X
No. of other speciality discharges X
Services
No. of day care services X
No. of ambulatory services X
No. of ancillary services X
No. of laboratory examinations X
No. of medical/clinical examinations X
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Prior to 1983, American hospitals were reimbursed based primarily on total costs; hence, there was little
incentive to reduce patient length of stay [111,112]. This changed with the implementation of the Prospective
Payment System based on DRGs. Under the new system, the hospital would be paid the same amount for
each Medicare patient within a DRG category, regardless of the costs incurred [112]. This represented a
signiﬁcant shift from the ‘‘inpatient day’’ to the ‘‘case’’ as the primary means of hospital reimbursement.
The ‘‘gold standard’’ in the US for measuring inpatient activity is thus DRG-adjusted discharges. As shown
in Fig. 3, the use of ‘‘inpatient days’’ as an output category has been steadily decreasing in US studies, from
80% in 1985 to zero currently. In testing alternative model speciﬁcations, Ozcan [56] found that efﬁciency
scores were highly sensitive to the form of this category and recommended using ‘‘cases’’ rather than
‘‘inpatient days.’’
In contrast, the reimbursement systems in European countries are more complex and varied [111]. Within
the last decade, several countries, such as Austria, Germany, Norway, Spain, and the UK, have moved from
‘‘cost-based’’ to more ‘‘case-based’’ reimbursement in order to better control health care expenditures. Europe
has thus followed the lead of the US DRG-system by introducing elements of competition and ‘‘deregulation’’
into hospital ﬁnancing. Hence, we can expect to see a shift away from ‘‘patient days’’ and toward ‘‘adjusted
discharges’’ as a measure of hospital output. Hofmarcher et al. [35], for example, included both ‘‘inpatient
days’’ and ‘‘discharges’’ in their model because, at the time, the reimbursement system in Austria was based on
inpatient days, independent of diagnoses and treatment. In a later Austrian study by Sommersguter-
Reichmann [74], however, ‘‘inpatient days’’ were excluded since this was no longer the main basis for hospital
reimbursement.
To capture case-mix, patient days were often disaggregated by: method of payment (e.g., ordinary
inpatients and Medicaid/Medicare patients); care intensity (e.g., acute, intensive, and long-term patients); and
hospital division (e.g., medical, surgical, obstetric, and psychiatric). Table 11 displays all output sets for this
category.
Many studies incorporated treatment intensity by differentiating among ‘‘acute care’’
[10–12,14,18,24,27,51,67,69,73,75,76], ‘‘intensive care’’ [14,18,24,26–28,51,66,67,69,73,75,76], and ‘‘long-term1991 -1994 1995 -1997 2001 -2004
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Fig. 3. Percentage of studies that use inpatients days as an output category, shows signiﬁcant decline due to changes in reimbursement.
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and ‘‘surgical inpatient days’’ within this output group.
6.3. Admissions, discharges, and services
Only a handful of studies, mainly non-US efforts, used the ‘‘number of admissions’’ as an output factor.
Several studies included DRG-adjusted discharges either as a single output category or as part of their larger
output set (see Table 12). A few studies used intermediate hospital products as outputs, such as ancillary
services [25] and laboratory examinations [1,2,47].
6.4. Atypical, teaching, and specific output categories
Several US studies addressed the problem of how to compare teaching and non-teaching hospitals
[29–31,53,55,56]. The former require additional resources to support their educational mission [53], where
medical residents are a source of inexpensive labor. Thus, hospital teaching can be viewed as both a labor
input and a teaching and research output. Fourteen studies [18,19,40–42,51,55,56,59–61,65,67,72] included
teaching sub-categories in their efﬁciency analyses. Sherman [72], for example, used ‘‘number of nursing
students’’ and ‘‘number of interns and residents receiving a 1-year training at the hospital.’’ Linna [40] and
Linna and Ha¨kkinen [41] proposed ‘‘number of residents,’’ ‘‘clinical training weeks of nurses,’’ and ‘‘clinical
training weeks of medical students’’ as outputs. Ozcan et al. [60], Lynch and Ozcan [42], Ozcan and Lynch
[61], and Ozcan and Luke [59] included ‘‘sum of medical and dental trainee full time equivalents’’ and ‘‘other
professional trainee full time equivalents’’ as outputs for their efﬁciency measurements. Ozcan [56] deﬁned
‘‘number of teaching full-time equivalent staff (FTEs)’’ as an output factor, while O0Neill [55] used ‘‘residents
trained.’’ Linna [40] and Linna and Ha¨kkinen [41] measured hospital research as the ‘‘number of scientiﬁc
publications.’’ Morey et al. [52,53] measured teaching output in terms of dollars spent on graduate medical
education. Two studies assessed hospital performance using various clinical [21] and ﬁnancial [62] ratios.
7. Leading contributors to the literature
A summary of the leading individual contributors to the literature studied here is presented in Table 13.
Yasar Ozcan was one of the ﬁrst to adopt DEA for health policy analysis and has authored or co-authored 16
studies on hospital efﬁciency through 2004 (see Table 13). In addition to numerous studies of US community
hospitals, he has examined specialty hospitals, such as military [5,58], psychiatric [63], and teaching [53], as
well as two recent studies of Turkish hospitals [22,70].
Vivian Valdmanis has published nine studies of US hospitals, with her recent work focused on
reimbursement for teaching and non-teaching hospitals [29–31]. A frequent co-author of Valdmanis, Shawna
Grosskopf, has focused on DEA with congestion [30] and the Malmquist index for longitudinal data [23].
Richard Morey has studied allocative DEA [51], DEA with quality considerations [52], and stochastic DEA
[69]. James Burgess and Paul Wilson co-authored four studies that examined Veterans Affairs and other US
hospital types using panel data and the Malmquist index [9–12].Table 13
Leading contributors to hospital efﬁciency literature, by author
Author Current afﬁliation Number of papers
Yasar Ozcan Virginia Commonwealth University 16
Vivian Valdmanis University of the Sciences in Philadelphia 9
Shawna Grosskopf Department of Economics, Oregon State University 6
Richard Morey School of Hotel Management and Tourism, Grifﬁth University, Queensland, Australia 5
James Burgess US Dept. of Veterans Affairs 4
Bruce Hollingsworth University of New Castle upon Tyne, UK 4
Nikolaos Maniadakis Patras General University Hospital, Greece 4
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and Emmanuel Thanassoulis. Their frequent collaborations include measuring the effect of market-based
reforms on UK-hospital efﬁciency [45], and extension of the Malmquist index to include price information
[46,47].
Prior to 1994, most DEA studies of hospital efﬁciency appeared in either management science/operations
research or health policy and management journals. The outlets that published the most studies during the
period 1984–2004 were as follows: The Journal of Medical Systems (10), Health Care Management Science
(HCMS) (9), Medical Care (8), European Journal of Operational Research (5), Health Services Research (4),
and Socio-Economic Planning Sciences (4). Other notable outlets include Omega (3) and Management Science
(2). HCMS is a relatively new journal that began in 1998 and has afﬁliations to both US and international/
non-US universities. The nine HCMS studies in this review came from a diverse group of countries, including:
Austria [35,74], Canada [32], Greece [1], the UK [38,45], the US [29,55], and Spain [66].
The last decade has seen the diffusion of DEA research into related disciplines, such as economics, health
economics, and policy analysis. Consider the diversity of journals in which such studies have appeared:
Applied Economics [46,64], Journal of Econometrics [44], Health Economics [40], The Journal of Productivity
Analysis [10,24], Journal of Public Economics [76], Journal of Accounting and Public Policy [8], Review of
Industrial Organization [18], and the IMA Journal of Mathematics Applied in Medicine & Biology [36].
‘‘Frontier-based techniques for efﬁciency measurement’’ was also the subject of a special issue of the Journal of
Health Economics (vol. 13, 1994).8. Discussion and conclusions
When the ﬁrst study on DEA for health care efﬁciency measurement was published by Sherman [72] more
than twenty years ago, it would have been hard to imagine the rapid growth and wide-ranging inﬂuence of this
research framework. In tracing the diffusion of these studies, the current paper has identiﬁed insights into the
process by which research ideas spread. The concept of ‘‘DEA for hospital efﬁciency’’ has proven to be both
relevant across disciplines, and surprisingly ﬂuid and versatile, as it has been adapted to numerous health care
systems. Taken collectively, the 25 European studies published since 1994 in English have re-vitalized this
area, and shown DEA to be a valuable tool for health care policy-making and resource allocation decisions.
The European studies differ from their US counterparts in that the majority incorporated price information,
used panel data, and combined DEA with other techniques, while, in some cases, extending existing
models [23,47].
The external environment was seen to exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on DEA model development, thus leading
to noteworthy differences between US and European studies. In European countries, for example, Health
Authorities inﬂuence resource allocation, reimbursement, and hospital priorities. In contrast, the US system is
more decentralized, and strategy is generally set by the executives of each hospital or hospital system. Thus, as
noted previously, the European studies were more likely to measure allocative efﬁciency and use DEA in
conjunction with other techniques, such as SFA and the Malmquist index.
DEA and SFA were found to yield similar efﬁciency estimates for European hospitals [38,41], but divergent
results for their US counterparts [17]. This suggests that allocative inefﬁciency is more of a problem in the US
than in Europe. Such inefﬁciency occurs when hospitals compete in a medical ‘‘arms race’’ by purchasing
expensive technology in order to attract physicians and patients [57]. This strategy might be locally optimal
but globally inefﬁcient, since it leads to excess hospital capacity and partially empty surgical suites for some
high-technology procedures, such as organ transplantation.
The taxonomy proposed here can serve as a useful tool for policy makers in assembling new DEA-models
via a step-by-step process: From selection of the best method, to choice of the input and output categories,
and, ﬁnally, to presentation of the results. Looking forward, the question arises as to what sort of work
remains to be done? Much of the attention to date has been on health policy rather than health management;
that is, on the health care system rather than the individual institution. In our view, DEA has yet to make
signiﬁcant inroads into several important areas where it could be of real value, e.g., in support of managerial
decision-making within hospitals and outpatient settings.
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DEA to determine appropriate levels of capacity expansion for hospital surgical specialties. Also, Chilingerian
and Sherman [120] employed DEA to develop quality frontiers for primary care physicians.
Some of the obstacles that have hampered efforts to date include the complexity of health care processes,
and the ambiguity surrounding the deﬁnition of appropriate input and output categories, as well as the lack of
reliable cost data. Yet, this ‘‘quagmire’’ of performance assessment in health care also represents an
opportunity for the continued diffusion of DEA in the area.Acknowledgments
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Section 3: Annex 
 
Abstract 
 
In Europe, the US, and other Western countries, the interest of executives in containing 
health care costs and increasing the sector’s efficiency has been high on the political agenda. 
Careful planning and coordination of resource, process, and financial management is 
imperative for increasing the efficiency of hospitals, which consume a large share of total 
health care expenditures. To reduce this financial burden, national, regional, and local 
governments search for suitable approaches.  
A first step towards the evaluation of a health care system and, as a consequence, the 
efficient distribution of human and economic resources in these sectors, is efficiency 
measurement. Reviewing the application of efficiency measurements in the hospital sector 
was, therefore, the key motivation for deriving a taxonomy of hospital efficiency studies, 
which classifies studies using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and related techniques. In 
this taxonomy a particular focus was placed on identifying the most important input and 
output variables. The analysis of the input variables served to identify key categories in the 
decision making processes, whereas the analysis of the output variables aimed at identifying 
key categories for performance measurement. In the course of the analysis of the input 
variables, three broad categories were derived: “capital investment”, “labor”, and 
“operating expenses”. Analyzing the output variables led to “medical visits, cases, patients, 
and surgeries”, “inpatient days”, and “admission, discharges, and services” being identified 
as major categories.  
In contrast to ex-post efficiency evaluations using DEA or similar techniques, simulation 
games, which reproduce the complex decision making processes within hospitals, enable ex-
ante evaluations of reforms and the training, for example, of present or future hospital 
managers. To assess the current state of the art of hospital management games a 
comprehensive literature review was conducted. A taxonomy was derived to determine the 
state of the art of existing hospital games, their main characteristics as well as their 
shortages with respect to, for example, the adaption to new reimbursement systems. This 
taxonomy categorizes and investigates such games in terms of general classification 
attributes, application area, target player groups, decision making, and the OR techniques 
used. The analysis reveals that the core of hospital management games consists of the 
modeling of the complex decision making processes in internal resource, process, and 
financial management in the context of the external hospital environment. It also highlights 
the increasing importance of hospital management games and OR techniques in planning 
the use of scarce resources in times of tight budgets, growing health care demand, and 
increasing technology costs.  
Having determined the most important variables for decision making and hospital 
performance, and knowing the state of the art of hospital management games, the business 
logic of COREmain hospital, an internet based hospital management game, was derived. 
COREmain hospital illustrates the economic and organizational decision making processes in 
a hospital by using discrete event simulation. The game simulates a region with up to six 
hospitals competing against each other for inpatients in different disease categories and 
budgets contingent on hospital missions, regional health policy, inpatient reimbursement 
systems (day-, case-, or global-budget based) as well as labor and radiology technology 
markets. Twelve decision periods are simulated. Within different game situations, the 
players can evaluate the outcome of alternative decisions, as, for example, in capacity 
planning and patient scheduling. The performance of each hospital is evaluated on pre-
selected performance measures at the end of each period. The winner of the game is the 
hospital player group which performed best both in fulfilling their own hospital mission 
targets and the regional health policy. COREmain hospital is unique due to the internet-
based framework, the combination of resource, process, and financial result management, 
in a set-up with interchangeable reimbursement systems and environmental conditions. It is 
a promising tool for training more efficient decision making in hospitals. It seeks not only to 
help students and hospital staff understand decision making in complex situations, but also 
to illustrate to policy makers how potential changes in regulation impact hospital decision 
making and outcomes. Its deployment in teaching, policy, and research might improve policy 
making at the hospital, regional, and national levels. 
Zusammenfassung 
 
In Europa, den USA und vielen anderen westlichen Ländern sind Maßnahmen zur 
Kostendämpfung und Effizienzsteigerung im Gesundheitssektor seit geraumer Zeit 
Gegenstand der politischen Diskussion. Eine sorgfältige Planung und Koordination von 
Ressourcen, Prozessen und Finanzen ist eine Grundvoraussetzung, um die Effizienz von 
Krankenhäusern, die für einen großen Anteil der Gesundheitsausgaben verantwortlich sind, 
zu steigern. Dementsprechend suchen nationale, regionale und lokale Regierungen nach 
geeigneten Ansätzen, um diese finanziellen Belastungen zu reduzieren.  
Ein erster Schritt in die Richtung der Evaluierung von Gesundheitssystemen und 
infolgedessen eine effiziente Verteilung von Human- und ökonomischen Ressourcen stellt 
deren Effizienzmessung dar. Um verschiedene Ansätze der Effizienzmessung im 
Krankenhaussektor bewerten zu können, wurde eine Taxonomie, die auf die Untersuchung 
und Klassifizierung von Krankenhauseffizienzstudien mittels Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) oder verwandter Methoden abzielt, erstellt. Ein spezieller Fokus dieser Taxonomie 
liegt auf der umfassenden Analyse von Input- und Outputvariablen, die bei der 
Effizienzbestimmung von Krankenhäusern eingesetzt werden. Die Untersuchung der 
Inputvariablen diente der Identifizierung wichtiger Größen in Entscheidungs- und 
Planungsprozessen. Die Analyse der Outputvariablen zielte auf das Eruieren zentraler 
Kennzahlen für die Performance Messung ab. Bei der Analyse der Input- und 
Outputvariablen konnten jeweils drei zentrale Kategorien ermittelt werden: “capital 
investment”, “labor” und “operating expenses” im Bereich der Inputgrößen und “medical 
visits, cases, patients, and surgeries”, “inpatient days” und “admission, discharges, and 
services” im Bereich der Outputgrößen.  
Im Gegensatz zu ex-post Effizienzanalysen mittels DEA oder verwandter Methoden, 
ermöglichen Planspiele, die den komplexen Entscheidungs- und Planungsprozess in 
Krankenhäusern abbilden, eine ex-ante Evaluierung von Reformvorhaben. Zudem tragen sie 
zum Beispiel zur Ausbildung von gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Krankenhausmanagern bei. 
Um den aktuellen Stand existierender Planspiele, ihre Hauptcharakteristika und ihre 
Schwächen (z.B. fehlende Adaptierung an geänderte Patientenvergütungssysteme) zu 
erfassen, wurde eine umfassende Literaturrecherche durchgeführt. In diesem 
Zusammenhang wurde eine Taxonomie erstellt, die derartige Krankenhausplanspiele 
hinsichtlich allgemeiner Klassifizierungsmerkmale, Anwendungsgebiete, Zielgruppen, 
Entscheidungs- und Planungsprozesse sowie eingesetzter OR-Methoden untersucht und 
kategorisiert. Die Untersuchung der einzelnen Spiele zeigt, dass die Modellierung der 
internen Entscheidungs- und Planungsprozesse unter Berücksichtigung externer 
Gegebenheiten das Herzstück eines jeden Planspiels darstellt. Die Untersuchung 
veranschaulicht ebenfalls, dass Krankenhausplanspiele und Operations Research in Zeiten 
von knappen Budgets, steigender Nachfrage nach Gesundheitsversorgung und steigenden 
Technologiekosten in der Verwendung von knappen Ressourcen sehr an Bedeutung 
gewonnen haben.  
Mit Kenntnis der wichtigsten Größen in Entscheidungs- und Planungsprozessen und zur 
Performance Messung sowie des State-of-the-art von Krankenhausplanspielen wurde die 
Business Logik von COREmain hospital, einem internet-basierten Krankenhausplanspiel, 
entwickelt. COREmain hospital bietet einen Einblick in den ökonomischen und 
organisatorischen Entscheidungs- und Planungsprozess zentraler Aufgaben im komplexen 
System Krankenhaus. Die Prozesse werden unter Zuhilfenahme von Diskreter-Event-
Simulation simuliert. Die bis zu sechs Krankenhäuser einer Region konkurrieren über eine 
Dauer von zwölf Perioden um Patienten und Budget in Abhängigkeit von ihrer Mission, der 
regionalen Gesundheitspolitik, dem Patientenvergütungssystem (Tagespauschalen, 
Fallpauschalen, globales Budget), der Arbeitsmarktsituation und den am Markt verfügbaren 
Röntgengeräten. Die Spieler lernen in einer komplexen, interdisziplinären 
Entscheidungssituation zielgerichtete Entscheidungen zu treffen. Dabei können sie 
unterschiedliche Managementstrategien z.B. im Bezug auf Kapazitäts- und Ablaufplanung 
anwenden und ihre Auswirkungen prüfen. Die Performance eines Krankenhauses wird 
anhand vordefinierter Zielvorgaben nach jeder Spielperiode gemessen. Sieger ist jenes 
Krankenhaus, das sowohl die selbst definierten als auch die regional vorgegeben Ziele 
bestmöglich erreicht. Die Innovation von COREmain hospital im Vergleich zu existierenden 
Krankenhausplanspielen besteht in den internet-basierten Rahmenbedingungen, der 
Verbindung von Ressourcen-, Prozess- und Finanzmanagement und der Möglichkeit zur 
Simulierung unterschiedlicher Patientenvergütungssysteme. Es ist ein vielversprechendes 
Trainingsinstrument, um die Grundlagen für einen effizienten Entscheidungs- und 
Planungsprozess zu vermitteln. Das Planspiel möchte nicht nur Studenten und 
Krankenhauspersonal die Entscheidungsfindung in komplexen Situationen verdeutlichen, 
sondern auch Entscheidungsträgern die Auswirkungen von geänderten Bestimmungen auf 
die Entscheidungsbildung in Krankenhäusern veranschaulichen. Der Einsatz dieses Planspiels 
in Lehre, Politik und Forschung könnte zu verbesserten Entscheidungs- und 
Planungsprozessen auf Spitals-, regionaler und nationaler Ebene beitragen.  
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